

Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act

Report to Congress

February 2, 2005

Introduction

The Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act, PL 108-283, requires the Secretary of State to submit to "appropriate congressional committees" a report on the conflict in Uganda, including a description of the following:

- (1) The individuals or entities that are providing financial and material support for the Lord's Resistance Army, including a description of any such support provided by the Government of Sudan or by senior officials of such Government.*
- (2) The activities of the Lord's Resistance Army that create obstacles that prohibit the provision of humanitarian assistance or the protection of the civilian population in Uganda.*
- (3) The practices employed by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces in northern and eastern Uganda to ensure that children and civilians are protected, that civilian complaints are addressed, and that any member of the armed forces that abuses a civilian is held accountable for such abuse.*
- (4) The actions carried out by the Government of the United States, the Government of Uganda, or the international community to protect civilians, especially women and children, who have been displaced by the conflict in Uganda, including women and children that leave their homes and flee to cities and towns at night in search of security from sexual exploitation and gender-based violence.*

PL 108-283, Section 4 (b) (1)-(4).

"Appropriate congressional committees" are defined as the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives. This report is submitted in fulfillment of these requirements.

Background on the Conflict in Northern Uganda

Since 1987, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, has waged an insurgency in northern Uganda, using camps in southern Sudan as a base for attacks on government forces and civilians.¹ According to the United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), LRA attacks had displaced nearly 95 percent of the ethnic Acholi population in Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts at the end of 2004. LRA tactics to brutalize civilians include murder, looting, burning houses, torture, mutilation, and abduction of children for the purposes of forced conscription, labor, and sexual servitude.

The LRA's origins lie in the confused military and political situation that followed President Yoweri Museveni's rise to power in 1986. A bizarre and cult-like group, the LRA once claimed to seek to topple Museveni and govern Uganda according to the Ten Commandments. It drew upon grievances and disaffection in the ethnic Acholi community against a government it perceived as dominated by people from central and western Uganda. Today, the LRA has no discernable political agenda and survives through a vicious cycle in which children are abducted, brutalized and forced to become soldiers or the "wives" of LRA commanders, and sent back to carry out the next wave of terror and abductions. It has no support among credible Acholi leaders. The LRA has been designated a terrorist organization for immigration purposes, and placed on the U.S. Terrorist Exclusion List under Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 8 USC sec. 1882.

Erratic and vicious, Joseph Kony has nevertheless shown considerable tactical skill in eluding GOU military offensives and forging a fighting force comprised of leaders with prior Ugandan military experience and bands of brutalized children. The LRA has also benefited significantly from food, arms and refuge provided by the Government of Sudan (GOS) and militia groups allied to, and also supported by, the Sudanese government. The LRA apparently began to receive assistance from Sudan sometime in the early 1990s. Museveni claims that Sudanese support for the LRA and other Ugandan rebel groups was intended to topple him.² He further claims that these actions by Sudan led Uganda to support the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Whatever induced Sudan to begin supporting the LRA--or Museveni to support the SPLM--the GOS soon found the Ugandan rebel group useful in actions against the

¹ The origins of the LRA are complex. Joseph Kony apparently took up arms in late 1986 or early 1987. He was initially linked to the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) of Alice Auma Lakwena. The cult-like HSM began anti-government military operations in 1986 and was defeated by government forces in 1987. Lakwena, now living at a refugee camp in Kenya, is related to Kony and Kony is viewed by some of his followers as Lakwena's successor. In the mid-1980s, Kony also had ties to the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), a group formed to contest the 1986 seizure of power by Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM). Kony took over a UPDA division in February 1987. Refugee Law Project (Kampala), "Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda," Working Paper No. 11, February 2004, p. 5-6 (hereafter "Refugee Law Project"). UPDA leadership agreed to a peace deal with the government in June 1988. By that time, Kony had begun independent operations and the LRA had begun to assume a separate identity.

² "Sudan Plotted Coup - Museveni", New Vision (Kampala), August 30, 2004.

SPLM and its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). LRA forces, for instance, are said to have helped Sudanese government forces recapture the key southern town of Torit from SPLA forces in October 2002.³

In March 2002 Uganda launched "Operation Iron Fist" with Sudanese agreement in an effort to eliminate LRA bases in southern Sudan. However, the humanitarian situation in northern Uganda deteriorated dramatically as LRA forces returned in force to Uganda in June 2002. The LRA in June 2003 expanded attacks from the northern Acholi sub-region to the eastern Lango and Teso sub-regions, causing massive displacement of civilians.

The resulting humanitarian crisis is "the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today," Jan Egeland, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, told the press in November 2003. By the end of 2004, according to the U.N. World Food Program (WFP), more than 1.3 million Ugandans were displaced and lived in camps without adequate protection, water, sanitation facilities, and health care, vulnerable to further LRA attacks and disease.⁴ The conflict severely undermined food production and food security, even in normally productive agricultural areas. Continued insecurity also hindered the ability of relief workers to provide humanitarian assistance and deliver relief supplies. As the scale of the conflict widened in 2003 and 2004, LRA child abductions also increased. An estimated 20,000 children have been abducted since the conflict began, including an estimated 12,000 since the beginning of Operation Iron Fist.

It is difficult to estimate the number of deaths caused directly or indirectly by the conflict in northern Uganda. Direct fatalities include deaths by combatants on both sides, civilians killed in military operations or terrorist attacks, and civilians (including children) executed or worked to death by the LRA. We estimate that the number of such fatalities in 2003 was approximately 3,000. A comparable number is likely to have been killed in 2004. Overall, it is estimated that there have been 10,000-12,000 "direct" fatalities in the course of this conflict. Indirect fatalities are far more numerous. The higher incidence of hunger, malnutrition and disease attributable to the conflict in northern Uganda and affected regions of southern Sudan account, at minimum, for tens of thousands of additional deaths. Infant mortality and child malnutrition rates, for instance, remain very high in northern Uganda despite massive efforts to provide humanitarian relief.

The conflict has also closed many schools and forced others to relocate, brought economic activity to a near-standstill, and severely impacted the delivery of health services, clean drinking water and other essential services. In Gulu District, for instance, 33 primary and six secondary schools have been abandoned or relocated because of the conflict. Overall, half the primary schools in northern Uganda are said to have been

³ Refugee Law Project, p. 19; "Sides Accuse Each Other of Supporting LRA," UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), December 4, 2002.

⁴ In March 2004 WFP recorded 1.6 million displaced people. The subsequent decline was due mainly to resettlement in the stable eastern Teso sub-region.

destroyed or displaced, and one-third of health facilities are non-functional.⁵ Many schools were abandoned after LRA fighters, acting on Kony's orders, burned them down. Under-Secretary General Egeland found that at two internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in northern Uganda "more than 5,000 people are dependant on one water source alone. Each latrine is shared by several hundred people."⁶

By the second half of 2004, military cooperation between Uganda and Sudan had improved, and Ugandan military officials reported considerable success in anti-LRA operations. GOU-GOS cooperation was evident in the July 2004 attack by the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) on an extensive camp near Nisitu, in southern Sudan, occupied by Kony and his closest followers. Kony escaped, but a reported 122 rebels (some of them children) were killed. LRA operations in southern Sudan were seriously disrupted. Overall, UPDF military operations with modest U.S. military support in 2004 caused many casualties in the LRA ranks, but also permitted the capture, escape, or rescue of hundreds of former abductees. Largely because of military pressure, the number of LRA attacks on civilians in Uganda began to decline significantly in the second half of 2004.

By year's end, over 4,000 ex-LRA combatants had applied for and received unconditional amnesty under a government program begun in 2000. The amnesty program remained open to all LRA leadership, including Kony, despite the GOU's December 2003 request that the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate LRA leadership for war crimes. The ICC investigation is ongoing.

The GOU also pursued peace initiatives in 2004, culminating in a limited ceasefire from November 17 to December 31. The purpose of the ceasefire was to allow LRA leadership to gather and discuss proposed talks under the auspices of Betty Bigombe, a former minister in Museveni's government. Kony at times claimed to support the process, but did not say so publicly and never gave clear orders to his commanders to cease hostilities. Museveni insisted on a firm and public commitment to peace by LRA leadership, and their movement into agreed assembly areas, before extending the ceasefire. Despite a positive meeting between GOU and LRA negotiators on December 29, the ceasefire ended and fighting resumed on January 1, 2005. Dialogue between the GOU and the LRA also continued, however, and Bigombe delivered a revised ceasefire proposal to the LRA in early January. The January 9, 2004, signing of a comprehensive peace accord for ending Sudan's long civil war raised further hopes that both Khartoum and the new government in southern Sudan will cooperate more effectively with Uganda to eliminate the LRA threat and bring the war to a quick and permanent end.

Section 4 (b) (1) : Support for the LRA

⁵ Statement by Martin Mogwanja, UNICEF Representative in Uganda, June 14, 2004.

⁶ Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Briefing to the Security Council, October 21, 2004 (prepared text).

"The individuals or entities that are providing financial and material support for the Lord's Resistance Army, including a description of any such support provided by the Government of Sudan or by senior officials of such Government."

Government of Sudan

There is no question that the Government of Sudan has, through its army and other channels, provided significant and sustained support to the LRA. The nature of that support has varied, and it is difficult to say with precision when assistance began and when it has been interrupted or suspended. Ugandan officials have since mid-2004 reported good cooperation with the GOS in anti-LRA operations in southern Sudan.

At a press conference in Kampala in 2004, Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail admitted publicly that Sudan had supported the LRA. This assistance, he said, ended in 1999. There is ample evidence documenting GOS support for the LRA during the 1990s. Much of this evidence has been obtained from ex-LRA combatants, including former senior LRA officers. There is equally compelling evidence, indicating GOS support from 1999 to late 2003 or early 2004.

GOS support for the LRA is thought to have begun in 1994, following the collapse of an earlier peace initiative mediated by Betty Bigombe. After conducting over 300 interviews in northern Uganda, researcher Robert Gersony reported in 1997, "Following the collapse of the peace talks, LRA forces withdrew to southern Sudan, where they regrouped, retrained and were equipped with weapons, ammunition and land mines provided by the Government of Sudan."⁷ Various published interviews with ex-LRA combatants confirm these findings. In 1998 congressional testimony, for instance, a Human Rights Watch official quoted a "former abductee who spent two years in LRA captivity at Jebellin (sometimes spelled Jabalayn or Jebelen), approximately thirty miles south of Juba."⁸ The ex-abductee reported:

In the camps, we were together with the Arabs [Sudan government army]. The Sudan government gave food to the commanders, but we had to find our own food. I saw Sudanese Arab soldiers deliver weapons to the commanders of the LRA. The guns were brought to the LRA camp by airplane, and the soldiers unloading the guns were Arabs. They were big guns, machine guns. Other times, the guns were brought by lorries. The camp was called Jebellin, near Juba. [LRA leader Joseph] Kony was stationed there.⁹

The abductees, according to Human Rights Watch, reported that LRA camps were "located in territory controlled by the Sudan authorities, near Sudanese army outposts,

⁷ Gersony, Robert, "The Anguish of Northern Uganda," submitted to the U.S. Embassy, Kampala (August 1997).

⁸ "Crises in Sudan and Northern Uganda," Testimony of Jemera Rone, Human Rights Watch, before the House Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Africa, July 29, 1998.

⁹ Ibid.

and that the Sudan government actively provides support for the LRA by supplying the camps with weapons and food."¹⁰ They also reported that the LRA cooperated with the Sudanese army in carrying out operations against the SPLA.

In 1999, Sudan and Uganda signed an agreement mediated by The Carter Center pledging to "disband and disarm terrorist groups and to prevent any acts of terrorism or hostile actions that might originate in our territory that might endanger the security of the other nation." They further promised "not to harbor, sponsor, or give military or logistical support to any rebel groups, opposition groups, or hostile elements from each others' territories." The agreement was honored only in part, and Sudanese assistance to the LRA continued.

There are multiple reports describing LRA cooperation with Sudanese forces in recapturing the town of Torit from the SPLA in October 2002. In June 2003 the BBC quoted an ex-abductee that "in May this year I saw some Arabs wearing military uniforms bringing in supplies of military equipment and ammunition in trucks."¹¹ Much of Sudan's assistance was apparently channeled through the pro-government Equatoria Defense Force (EDF). By late 2003, some EDF commanders had begun to make separate deals with the SPLM and in March 2004 the EDF switched sides. Subsequent to the switch, the EDF's former commander, Martin Kenyii, described collaboration with Kony and the LRA that persisted until at least mid-2003. At that time, Kenyii said, he and Kony met in Juba; both had traveled there to consult with Sudanese military officials.

Despite continuing collaboration, there were also strains in GOS-LRA relationship and sometimes outright conflict. One high-ranking ex-LRA combatant told researchers, "by 2001, the relationship between Kony and Sudan was so bad . . . Kony got so annoyed that he was shooting at Government of Sudan vehicles."¹² UPDF actions against the LRA under "Operation Iron Fist" further strained the GOS-LRA relationship. In one March 2002 firefight, the LRA attacked a Sudanese unit, which was accompanied by several Ugandan liaison officers. A colonel and two other Sudanese officers were reported killed.¹³

UPDF attacks on LRA camps in southern Sudan provide additional evidence that the Sudan provided long-term refuge and other support to the LRA. Ex-abductees describe living for years under brutal conditions at Lubanga-Tek, which served as Kony's headquarters in southern Sudan until it was overrun by the UPDF in the first phase of Operation Iron First in March 2002.¹⁴ The extensive and apparently permanent camp was in an area of Sudanese government control, as were four other camps destroyed at the same time. The LRA, apparently aware that a UPDF attack was imminent, vacated the camps the night before the UPDF attacked.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ BBC, report by Will Ross, Kitgum, Uganda (June 12, 2003), available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2982818.stm>

¹² Refugee Law Project, p. 18.

¹³ "Captain Nsereko Missing in Sudan," *The Monitor* (Kampala), March 23, 2002, article by David Kibirige

¹⁴ See, for example, "Serve God, Or Be Beheaded: An LRA Rebel's Story," *The East African* (Nairobi), July 15, 2002, describing one girl's five years of captivity at Lubanga-Tek.

Ugandan officials also point to the well-established gardens, and the simple but permanent structures, discovered at Joseph Kony's camp at Birinyang, near Nisitu in southern Sudan, when UPDF forces attacked the camp in July 2004. The assault was carried out with the cooperation of the Sudanese military, and according to Ugandan officials almost succeeded in killing or capturing Joseph Kony. Ugandan officials note that Kony's Birinyang camp was less than three kilometers from a Sudanese military facility. Some ex-LRA combatants claim that Kony's forces and the nearest Sudanese military detachment at times used the same water borehole during the LRA's occupancy of Birinyang. The assault on Birinyang was the first significant UPDF operation north of the "red line"--the previous limit of permitted UPDF operations in southern Sudan under GOS-GOU agreements. Earlier in 2004, Ugandan officials accused Sudan of allowing Kony to retreat behind the "red line" to escape Ugandan military pressure.

President Museveni also accused Sudan of interfering with peace initiatives in the first half of 2004. "Mrs. Betty Bigombe went to Juba in Sudan, assisted by the Norwegians and myself," Museveni said in an official transcript of remarks to a group of western ambassadors in June 2004. "She has, however, discovered that the Sudan Government obstructed her and that Kony was not serious." Bigombe traveled to Juba in to attempt to meet with Kony. She was unable to do so and departed Juba in June 2004 to pursue her peace initiative from Uganda.¹⁵

The Sudanese Government denies that it has provided assistance to the LRA, at least after 1999. In view of the accumulating public evidence, much of it eyewitness accounts from ex-abductees, these denials are not credible. Nevertheless Ugandan officials state that Sudan has cooperated since mid-2004 in Ugandan efforts to defeat the LRA militarily or convince them to participate in serious negotiations. Some recently returned abductees, including those who held senior positions within the LRA, also report that Sudanese assistance has stopped.

External Supporters

The LRA has received financial and other support from sympathizers living outside Uganda. The nature of this support varies, as do the motives for providing it. It is difficult to quantify the amount or frequency of this support. There are credible reports that the Sudanese government has at times facilitated the travel of external supporters to and from LRA camps in southern Sudan. Most external supporters are motivated by a deep antipathy for Museveni and his government, and a hard core support the LRA's ostensible objective of seizing power. Others apparently believe that despite LRA attacks on the ethnic Acholi population, the LRA will ultimately avenge wrongs against the Acholi carried out by Museveni's army since 1986.

In any case, relations between Kony and external actors claiming to speak on behalf of the LRA are unclear and apparently strained. In 1998, for instance, Kony

¹⁵ "Sudan Blocks Bigombe-Kony Peace Mission," New Vision (Kampala), June 5, 2004

dismissed two ostensible "ministers" in the LRA's external wing.¹⁶ The external wing, active in London in the late 1990s and early 2000s, is now moribund. Kony is also thought to have ordered the killing of a former deputy whose interest in the government's amnesty program displeased the LRA chief.¹⁷

Nor does the LRA appear to have received significant amounts of material assistance from external supporters, at least in recent years. The LRA is currently experiencing severe food shortages and seems to have little money at its disposal. It has frequently launched attacks in both northern Uganda and southern Sudan to obtain relatively inexpensive medicines, car batteries and high-frequency radios. Many recent returnees are in poor physical condition, including senior commanders.

Some well-meaning external players--both Acholi and non-Acholi, Ugandan and non-Ugandan--have also been lured into providing various forms of questionable assistance. Generally, LRA commanders or their ostensible interlocutors seek this assistance as part of a supposed peace initiative. Funds have been requested to replenish the "air time" of LRA satellite telephones, care for the families of LRA commanders, buy needed medications, or provide resettlement assistance to combatants willing to come out of the bush. These arrangements are often fraudulent.

Internal Supporters and Collaborators

The LRA also has a small number of supporters and collaborators inside Uganda. As with external supporters, it is difficult to gauge the extent of their influence.

The GOU asserts that the LRA have informants in IDP camps, that LRA commanders regularly send money to family members in Uganda, and that some commanders have even acquired an interest in various businesses. Peasants are routinely reported to give food to armed LRA rebels who demand it, and goods stolen by LRA ambushes turn up quickly and regularly in Gulu market; Brig. Kenneth Banya, the senior LRA officer captured, talked about "commercial, not political collaborators." Recent contacts with LRA officers still in the bush reveal that they are well-informed of events in northern Uganda and throughout the country, and they are able to send and receive written messages from persons whom they wish to contact.

According to a senior UPDF officer in northern Uganda, Col. Nathan Mugisha, commander of the Fourth Division, the people of the north "are tired of this senseless conflict. But the elite in the towns in Uganda and abroad are busy fanning the insurgency."¹⁸ He added, "They buy mobile phones and airtime to monitor and report on the movement of the UPDF and other security deployment. They provide other logistics." Government officials, including President Museveni, have also at times bitterly criticized

¹⁶ "Kony Dismisses Two Top LRA Officials," *New Vision* (Kampala), October 27, 1998, article by Alfred Wasike.

¹⁷ See "Kony Sacks Otti Lagony," *New Vision* (Kampala), December 29, 1999, article by Billie O'Kadameri; see also "The Wages of Sin is Death, Museveni Reminds Kony," *New Vision* (Kampala), November 14, 2003 (speech by President Yoweri Museveni).

¹⁸ *New Vision* (Kampala), June 16, 2004, interview with Alfred Wasike

alleged collaboration between some Acholi leaders (including religious leaders and members of parliament) and the LRA.¹⁹

It is difficult to evaluate these claims. Publicly, all credible Acholi political, cultural and religious leaders have rejected the LRA. And popular opinion in northern Uganda is overwhelmingly anti-LRA. For its part, the LRA has never sought to achieve popular support, preferring to terrorize local populations and abduct new recruits. Acholi attitudes toward the LRA, and the government, are undoubtedly complex. Many in the LRA, after all, are abducted Acholi children, and most Acholi leaders therefore urge restraint in anti-LRA military actions and support for peace initiatives. Museveni also has little political support in ethnic Acholi districts, which have voted against him consistently in presidential elections. For the overwhelming majority of ethnic Acholi, however, these complexities do not result in support for the LRA--who have made the Acholi their principal victims.

Section 4(b)(2): LRA Activities

"The activities of the Lords' Resistance Army that create obstacles that prohibit the provision of humanitarian assistance or the protection of the civilian population in Uganda."

The LRA's record of torture, abduction, killing and attacks on civilian vehicles is the principal obstacle to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in northern and eastern Uganda. It is difficult to overstate the depredations wreaked upon the civilian population by the LRA. To cite only two of hundreds of examples:

Thirteen civilians, including a 76-year-old man, were yesterday night [June 5, 2003] killed by Joseph Kony's LRA rebels. Twelve had their heads battered with big sticks while the old man was shot in the back when the rebels invaded Zone D and E of Pabbo Internally Displaced Persons' camp. Four huts were set ablaze in the camp which is 24 miles on the Gulu-Juba road in Kilak county. The camp houses about 45,000 people. The deceased were tied with sisal ropes, killed and their bodies lined up along the road to Palaro sub-county headquarters, hardly 600 metres away from the Pabbo UPDF detachment.²⁰

Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) massacred 34 civilians using pangas and sticks at Biwang near Gere-gere, Omot sub-county, Agago county in Pader district on [October 22, 2002]. A witness said one of the dead was chopped into pieces and put in a big pot to be cooked. The rebels wanted the villagers to eat the body parts as a punishment for allowing one of their captives to escape

¹⁹ In 2003, for instance, Museveni said, "The Kony criminality, apart from the external sponsorship, has been encouraged by a tiny criminal clique of opportunists among the political class." "The Wages of Sin is Death, Museveni Reminds Kony," New Vision (Kampala), November 14, 2003 (speech by President K. Museveni).

²⁰ "Kony Butchers 13," New Vision (Kampala), June 6, 2003, article by Dennis Ojwee.

into Lalur-Onywal village with their gun. Fortunately, the UPDF arrived in armoured vehicles and dispersed the rebels.²¹

These are not the most destructive, or even the most dramatic, of recent LRA activities. In February 2004, for instance, the LRA attacked the Barlonyo IDP camp in Lira District, using rocket-propelled grenades, armour-piercing weapons, machetes and fire to kill at least 200 civilians. Two weeks earlier, rebels killed at least 50 people at another IDP camp. Not long after the Barlonyo attack, another dozen civilians were killed at yet another IDP camp. Annex 1 provides a summary of LRA attacks during 2004.

However horrific, LRA violence is neither random nor spontaneous. LRA field commanders maintain regular high-frequency radio contact with Joseph Kony and his senior deputies. Kony and his commanders order specific types of attacks on civilians to send specific messages. In the first example cited above, for instance, the LRA left behind a letter stating that the killings were revenge for provocative statements by government officials. In the second, LRA forces were carrying out a comprehensive terror campaign in Gulu District that Kony had ordered a few days before.

The LRA's impact on humanitarian relief operations is therefore enormous; indeed there would be no need for such operations but for the LRA. The LRA has at times targeted humanitarian relief deliveries directly, but more frequently raids villages and IDP camps to steal food and other assistance after it has been delivered. WFP's massive feeding program in northern Uganda has evolved complex protocols to ensure the safety of food deliveries, including regular security escorts by UPDF. The UPDF has at times been unable to provide escorts because of resources devoted to anti-LRA operations and other factors. The lack of escorts has often delayed food deliveries. At the end of 2004, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) reported that although access to the most isolated IDP camps remained problematic, improved coordination between non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN agencies, and the UPDF had led to more regular access to a greater number of camps. UN OCHA reported that in Gulu District, NGOs were increasingly able to access camps by the end of 2004, with 25 out of 33 camps accessible without military escort. Access in Kitgum District remained irregular, according to UN OCHA, but more due to the non-availability of UPDF escorts than to security incidents. The UN OCHA report added that several relief agencies, including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), did not rely on escorts and thus were able to maintain access to more remote camps. Security had also improved in the Teso sub-region, which had been relatively calm since the withdrawal of most LRA units by mid-2004. Improved access enabled relief agencies to provide assistance in the Teso region without military escort for the first time since LRA attacks began in mid-2003.

²¹ "Kony Stuffs Man Into Pot," *New Vision* (Kampala), October 24, 2002, article by Dennis Ojwee.

Section 4(b)(3): UPDF Efforts to Protect Civilians and Address Civilian Complaints

"The practices employed by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces in northern and eastern Uganda to ensure that children and civilians are protected, that civilian complaints are addressed, and that any member of the armed forces that abuses a civilian is held accountable for such abuse."

Military Efforts to Protect Civilians

The UPDF has deployed over 40,000 regular and militia troops in northern Uganda and southern Sudan, with a principal mission of attacking and destroying the LRA and protecting civilians from LRA attacks. UPDF detachments in or near population centers and IDP camps also help protect the civilian population. The UPDF's protection efforts are supplemented by militia or Local Defense Units (LDUs). The LDUs go by various names--the "Arrow Boys" in Soroti District, the "Amuka" in Lira District, the "Frontier Guards" in Kigum District--but their principal mission is to protect the civilian population from LRA attack.

The UPDF scored significant success in anti-LRA military operations in 2004. According to government figures, the UPDF killed 1068 enemy combatants between July and November, captured 224, processed 637 under the amnesty program, and rescued 537. At least three dozen UPDF soldiers were reported killed in action during this period.²² The UPDF also captured a wide range of weapons. Several senior LRA commanders were killed or captured, or "reported" to the Ugandan government under the amnesty program. LRA operations in both southern Sudan and northern Uganda were severely disrupted.

The UPDF/LDU record in protecting the civilian population, however, was mixed. The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative reported that the UPDF only intervened in 33 out of 456 attacks by the LRA in Kitgum and Pader districts between June and December 2002.²³ There were numerous examples of slow or ineffective responses by security forces to LRA attacks on civilian targets. In the Barlonyo massacre of February 2004, a handful of local militia proved no match for LRA attackers armed with RPGs and B-10 anti-tank weapons. In another of the attacks cited above, a UPDF private had been left in charge of camp defenses while fellow soldiers went to collect their pay, and the senior responsible officer was absent without authorization in Kampala.

President Museveni has repeatedly asserted that the best way to protect civilians and end the conflict is to target LRA leadership. Senior military officials also contend that the UPDF needs counterinsurgency training and assistance, and improved

²² Complete figures for 2004 are not available. In 2003, the UPDF reported 824 LRA killed in action, 279 captured, and 434 "reported" under the amnesty program. UPDF's losses were listed as 87 killed in action, 137 casualties, and 4 missing in action.

²³ Cited in Human Rights Watch, *Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda*, Vol. 15 No. 7 (A), March 2003.

transportation and communications resources--notably helicopters--to take the fight to the LRA. The civilian population in northern Uganda is scattered in over 150 IDP camps, UPDF officials point out, and the army does not have the manpower to prevent attacks against camps. Massive deployment to defend IDP camps, officials contend, would tie up valuable resources better used to attack the LRA. Since the Barlonya attack, the UPDF has established a strategy of perimeter security at the camps and been more effective in deterring attacks or limiting their damage.

LDUs supplement UPDF efforts and play a significant role in civilian protection efforts, especially when supported by local Acholi political leaders as in Kitgum and Pader districts. The number of troops in these militia expanded dramatically in 2004. Militia members receive little pay (approximately \$30 per month) and varying amounts of training, usually between 60 and 90 days. Many militia members complained of delays in payment, inadequate and irregular food supplies, and inadequate uniforms and equipment.²⁴ Critics contend that the militia could ultimately become a destabilizing force, in part because they are organized along ethnic lines. And although the militia are under the overall control of the UPDF, local politicians and others have been heavily involved in organizing militia and recruiting members. UPDF officials admit to some shortcomings in LDUs, but say they have made a valuable contribution. According to a senior UPDF commander in northern Uganda, the militia "guard camps, carry out road patrols, lay ambushes in suspected enemy routes and dominate any suspected areas."²⁵ President Museveni has praised the Arrow Boys militia for helping drive the LRA out of the Teso sub-region, but also said that in the aftermath of LRA withdrawal from the region, the group will be disarmed.²⁶

Finally, military officials state that despite many constraints, their overall civilian protection strategy is working: a combination of military pressure, depletion of the LRA ranks and ongoing peace initiatives (including the amnesty program) produced a marked decline in LRA attacks on IDP camps and other civilian targets during the second half of 2004.

Protecting Formerly Abducted Children

Each UPDF division operates Child Protection Units (CPU) for children (including child combatants) who are captured or escape from the LRA. The CPU works closely with NGOs providing assistance to returnees. CPU facilities are rudimentary but well run, and children are usually released quickly to the custody of NGOs. There are reports, however, that some ex-combatants under the age of 18 have been detained and taken to the field to assist the UPDF with reconnaissance and intelligence. There are also reports that some underage ex-combatants have been beaten after capture by the UPDF, and before delivery to the CPU. Most testimony from formerly abducted children during

²⁴ Parliament of Uganda, Report of the Select Committee on Humanitarian and Security Situation in the Acholi, Teso and Lango Subregions, June 2004.

²⁵ Interview with Col. J. Etygang, Fifth Division commander, Tarehe Sita (Kampala), November 2004.

²⁶ "Government to Disarm Militias," *The Monitor* (Kampala), September 1, 2004, article by Joe Oboi Esamukoit.

2004, however, indicates that they were treated humanely once they came into UPDF custody.

The UPDF recruits adult LRA ex-combatants (most of whom were abducted as children) into the army.²⁷ Many recent recruits have been placed in the newly-established 105th battalion, whose rank-and-file consists entirely of ex-LRA. The UPDF makes no apology for this recruitment, which has been criticized by many human rights advocates. Ex-combatants have few economic alternatives and appear to join these units voluntarily, and have reportedly been quite effective in anti-LRA military operations. Critics contend that continued military service by ex-LRA abductees is traumatizing and should be discouraged. They also urge the government to find more suitable economic activities for ex-abductees, but offer few resources to do this.

Some reports state that children, including former abductees, are recruited into the UPDF and LDUs.²⁸ UNICEF, the Christian Children's Fund and others have worked closely with the UPDF, and to some extent with LDUs, to monitor and prevent this practice. Though data are incomplete, the overall incidence of underage recruitment appears to be low. In a recent exercise, UNICEF officials identified 130 recruits from a population of approximately 720 in the ex-LRA 105th battalion who appeared to be underage. UNICEF investigated 35 of the recruits in detail and found two under 18. CCF carried out similar exercises with several LDUs and, in preliminary results, found a slightly higher incidence of apparent underage recruitment.

Ugandan law prohibits military service by a person under 18 years old. UPDF officials assert that the army does not intentionally recruit children, and that underage youth collaborate with parents and corrupt local officials to mislead recruiters about their actual age. They point out that this phenomenon is common around the world, and exacerbated in Uganda by the absence of reliable and standardized birth certificates or other documents to prove age. A UNICEF official agrees that "there isn't in Uganda a deliberate policy to recruit children." He added, "No one is questioning the sincerity of the Ugandan government. But there are big problems in the implementation [of safeguards]."²⁹ UPDF officials also admit that LDUs have been less vigilant than the UPDF in excluding underage recruits.

Other Protection Initiatives Within the UPDF

In 2004 the UPDF signed a memorandum of understanding with Save the Children Uganda to implement a program to improve child protection and promotion of children's rights by the armed forces. This program represented a continuation of collaboration between Save the Children and the UPDF that has been ongoing for at least

²⁷ Ugandan law prohibits the recruitment of any person under 18 years old.

²⁸ See Human Rights Watch, *Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda*, March 2003 Vol.15, No. 7 (A)

²⁹ Mads Oyen, UNICEF child protection officer for Uganda, quoted in "Uganda should do more to stop child soldier recruitment - UNICEF," November 13, 2003, UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN).

five years. In the course of this collaboration, Save the Children has conducted numerous workshops and trainings on child protection issues, with a particular focus on military personnel in northern Uganda. Likewise, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a long-standing relationship with the UPDF and provides resources and training on international humanitarian law and related issues. The most recent example was a course for the UPDF's information team conducted at Army General Headquarters in November 2004.

The UPDF also has a human rights desk, with a mandate to investigate complaints against members of the security forces, inspect places of detention, promote human rights within the army, and liaise with local and international human rights groups.³⁰ The UPDF's human rights desk also collaborates with the Uganda Human Rights Commission, as described below.

Addressing Civilian Complaints and Holding Security Forces Accountable

President Museveni speaks frequently on the importance of good civil-military relations. "Why should you bark at people because you are a soldier?" he recently asked students at the UPDF's Senior Command and Staff College. "If any of you misbehaves, you must be punished."³¹ Defense Minister Amama Mbabazi adds,

The UPDF observes a very strict code of conduct. There have been isolated incidents of criminal or undisciplined behavior by government soldiers. The UPDF has set up a human rights desk, where such incidents can be reported. All complaints are being investigated and, if evidence against them is found, the soldiers are being court martialled.³²

Both Museveni and Mbabazi cite the execution of two soldiers in Kitgum in March 2003, after they had been convicted of murder by a field court martial, as evidence of the UPDF's tough stand against criminality in the military.³³

One procedure for civilians filing a complaint against a member of the security forces is to contact the local UPDF commander, who reviews the complaint and refers it to the UPDF's human rights desk. The human rights desk investigates and, if appropriate, refers the matter to a court martial. In addition to reviewing human rights complaints, the

³⁰ "The Role of Human Rights Desk in UPDF," June 2004, Tarehe Sita, article by Major Charles Wacha Angulo.

³¹ "Museveni Warns Army on Misconduct," November 2004, Tarehe Sita, article by Veronica Ndagire

³² "The Belgian Report is Alarmist," June 2004, Tarehe Sita, article by Minister of Defence Amama Mbabazi, responding to the International Crisis Group report "Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict."

³³ "Soldiers Executed in Kitgum," New Vision (Kampala), March 4, 2003, article by James Odong and Dennis Ojwee. In another recent incident, the UPDF punished an officer who failed to protect civilians from attack by the LRA. Captain Frederick Kavuma was court-martialed in March 2004 for being drunk when the LRA attacked the Lira-Palwo IDP camp, reportedly killing 13 people. Kavuma was sentenced to three months in jail, stripped of his rank, and expelled from the army. "UPDF Capt Sacked," New Vision (Kampala), May 10, 2004, article by Chris Ochowun.

human rights desk is expressly charged with handling "matters of domestic violence and other family related issues."

Civilians also have the option of pursuing criminal or civil complaints against members of the security forces in civilian courts, and filing complaints with the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC). UHRC has power to investigate and adjudicate human rights complaints, and can order government agencies found to have violated citizens' rights to pay significant fines and restitution. In 2003, the last year for which complete data are available, UHRC received 2050 complaints (about one in six of which was filed at the commission's office in Gulu). The commission selected 830 complaints for further investigation. The UPDF was named as a respondent in 54 cases.

The question of accountability by members of the security forces is particularly complex in the case of gender-based violence and crime. There are frequent, generalized assertions that security forces are involved in acts of rape, "defilement" (the crime of sexual contact with a person under 18),³⁴ child prostitution and gender-based violence. Many of these reports lack specificity. According to one news report, for instance, the UHRC officer in charge of northern Uganda, Francis Ogwal, told a workshop in Gulu that residents from two IDP camps told him of incidents of rape involving soldiers.³⁵ A UPDF spokesman criticized the report, stating that the army had never received complaints in the cases. The spokesman also asserted that various forms of pre-marital sex are mistakenly characterized as "rape" in Acholi culture. The number of these reports, however, show that gender-based crime is a significant problem, and there is persuasive anecdotal and case-specific evidence of involvement by members of the security forces.³⁶

Problems of sexual coercion, child sex and gender-based violence are rooted in a general social breakdown in northern Uganda. A parliamentary select committee recently found "overwhelming" social problems arising from "inability of parents to provide for children, breakdown of families, increase in domestic violence, [and] fights over conjugal rights which encampment denied couples."³⁷ So-called "night commuters"--who travel from rural areas to towns and centers each night seeking protection from LRA attacks--appear to be particularly vulnerable. Gangs of young males, many of them children, are frequently cited as perpetrators of sexual crimes against female night commuters.³⁸

³⁴ The crime of defilement is common, and is frequently prosecuted. In 2004, 1,878 persons were convicted of defilement and 1,818 were waiting trial.

³⁵ "UPDF Cited in Rape," *New Vision* (Kampala), November 10, 2004, article by Chris Ochowun and Anne Mugisa

³⁶ For instance, a Ugandan human rights group reported: "48 year old woman (name withheld on request) arrested by the army from Pabbo camp on 6 June, 2002 was raped by four UPDF soldiers three times a day for three days consecutively when she was arbitrarily detained at the Gulu Military barracks." *Foundation for Human Rights Initiative, "The Human Rights Reporter, 2001-2002,"* p. 90.

³⁷ Parliament of Uganda, "Report of the Select Committee on Humanitarian and Security Situation in the Acholia, Teso and Lango Subregions," June 2004.

³⁸ Women's Commission For Refugee Women and Children, "No Safe Place to Call Home: Child and Adolescent Night Commuters in Northern Uganda," July 2004, p. 7. The parliamentary select committee also cited the danger adolescent girls face from "gang defilement (by the so-called 'Alub' boys)."

There are also credible reports of parents abetting child prostitution to increase family income. Data suggest that girls in northern Uganda drop out of school earlier, have sex earlier, and are more likely to be infected by HIV/AIDS than their peers in the rest of the country.

Few formal complaints have been lodged against members of the security forces for these offenses, and still fewer have been convicted or punished. It is difficult to determine the degree to which these numbers reflect an actual low incidence of these offenses, the social stigma of reporting them, the use of alternative cultural mechanisms for addressing these issues, fear of retribution, or the ineffectiveness of civil and military accountability mechanisms.

In practice, this UPDF's system of processing civilian complaints has a number of shortcomings.³⁹ The UPDF is feared by many ordinary civilians in northern Uganda and its record of civil-military relations is mixed.⁴⁰ The behavior and reputation of individual commanders, moreover, has a direct impact on whether civilians are willing to file complaints, and how those complaints are handled. Neither the human rights desk nor officers responsible for civil-military relations have adequate resources. The relation between the UPDF's complaint processing system, the civil judicial process and the UHRC needs to be clarified, and links between the various systems need to be strengthened. The UPDF says it recognizes these shortcomings, and plans to establish a "one-stop" reporting center in northern Uganda where victims can be advised of all remedies available through UPDF, UHRC and the civilian courts.

Section 4(b)(4): GOU and International Protection Efforts

"The actions carried out by the Government of the United States, the Government of Uganda, or the international community to protect civilians, especially women and children, who have been displaced by the conflict in Uganda, including women and children that leave their homes and flee to cities and towns at night in search of security from sexual exploitation and gender-based violence."

A Note on Night Commuters

Parliament of Uganda, "Report of the Select Committee on Humanitarian and Security Situation in the Acholi, Teso and Lango Subregions," June 2004.

³⁹ Civilian procedures appear to be little better. One study found that "in Kitgum, there is no central reporting system for rape survivors, who face many barriers to coming forward with their experiences and do not receive support services. Even if they do come forward, few social service structures are in place to assist them. Most medical and other authorities are not trained to identify and counsel potential rape survivors, while the legal system requires parents to press charges, with survivors bearing the burden of proof." Women's Commission For Refugee Women and Children, "No Safe Place to Call Home: Child and Adolescent Night Commuters in Northern Uganda," July 2004, p. 8:

⁴⁰ Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 11, pages 29-32

During 2004, the estimated number of "night commuters" in northern Uganda ranged from 32,000 to 52,000, depending on security conditions and other factors.⁴¹ The overwhelming majority of night commuters are children. Their motivation in seeking refuge in towns and cities was in almost all cases to avoid attacks and abduction by the LRA. Thus night commuters traveled to various centers despite, not because of, the risk of sexual exploitation and gender-based violence.

Defining "Protection"

The protection of IDPs and other civilians includes more than military and security measures, and more than the provision of food and other material assistance. USAID, for instance, cites a "growing acknowledgment within the international community that material assistance alone often cannot ensure the well-being of IDPs."⁴² Humanitarian assistance and development strategies should therefore "do more to protect IDPs and other vulnerable populations from violence, abuse, exploitation, and harassment." Thus USAID uses a broad definition of "protection," and works to ensure that IDPs be granted "the full security and protection provided for under norms of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and national law." Other international development and humanitarian assistance agencies take a similarly broad approach to the protection of IDPs and vulnerable civilians.

GOU Protection Efforts

The GOU's principal response to the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda has been the military effort to defeat the LRA, comprising zonal forces that protect civilians and mobile forces that seek out and attack LRA groups. The government has also authorized peace talks with the LRA in an effort to end the conflict. Both tracks are supported by GOU and diplomatic initiatives, particularly with Sudan. The government also carries out other activities that fall within a broad definition of "protection". Many of these are core government functions, including the provision of health, education, and water and sanitation services. All have been severely disrupted by the conflict, but all continue--with significant donor assistance.

In 2004 the GOU approved a national policy on internal displacement of persons, creating a key framework for addressing protection issues. The government also ended its policy of not recognizing certain informal IDP camps -- a policy that had prevented some camps from receiving protection from the UPDF and had limited the provision of humanitarian assistance. In early September, senior government officials, UN representatives, civil society and NGO representatives agreed on a "framework for action" for the protection of civilians, based on five key objectives:

⁴¹ USAID/OFDA, "Uganda Complex Emergency," Sitrep No. 1, FY 2005. January 5, 2005, p. 2.

⁴² USAID, "USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy," October 2004, p. 8.

- to secure safe and unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the north of Uganda;
- to improve camp management and conditions as a step to durable solutions;
- to adopt special responses for women and children;
- to reduce the availability of weapons and improve readiness for demobilization; and
- to establish momentum for reconciliation through revived judicial structures and effective reconciliation processes.⁴³

There has been some progress on each of these objectives, along with continuing serious shortcomings. The UPDF has played a key role in improving humanitarian access and the GOU has forged effective partnerships with NGOs and UN agencies to facilitate the delivery of food and other humanitarian assistance. IDP camp management has improved in many areas, with more effective integration of local government and camp structures. On the other hand, the GOU had pursued a concept called "protected" IDP camps. The government ordered the citizens of these districts into these camps in order to protect them and those who did not go were "assumed" by UPDF to be in collaboration with the LRA and were left vulnerable. Additionally, proper provisions were not made for these camps as to health, water, and sanitation, leaving many IDPs feeling anything but "protected." In Teso region alone, this lack of "protection" brought about the formation of the "Arrow Boys" militia, who, ironically, provided protection to the IDPs from LRA members.

International donors provide most of the funding for special programs targeting women and children, including programs to combat gender-based violence. These programs have, however, been developed and implemented in cooperation with the GOU. There has been little progress on disarmament or the interdiction of arms flows. The government's Amnesty Commission is supporting the demobilization of individual LRA combatants, with support from the World Bank and other donors. These and other agencies are making preparations for a more comprehensive disarmament and demobilization program if the GOU reaches a peace agreement with the LRA. The government supports a growing range of reconciliation activities, with support from USAID's Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) and other programs.

U.S. and International Protection Efforts

U.S. and other international protection efforts cover a similarly broad range of activities. To begin with the most specific, international donors provide direct support for formerly abducted children and adults by funding "reception centers." These centers provide for the ex-abductee's immediate medical needs, assist in tracing and reuniting families, and provide "life skills" and psychosocial support. The centers also work with families and the receiving community to prepare for reintegration of ex-abductees. USAID supports reception centers in Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts. The Gulu

⁴³ Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Briefing to the Security Council, October 21, 2004 (prepared text).

Support the Children Organization (GUSCO), for instance, is currently the beneficiary of a five-year \$253,000 USAID grant.

The importance of food aid plays an enormous role in protecting IDPs. U.S. Food aid funding consists of \$57 million in FY 2003 and \$56 million in FY 2004, and up to \$30 million for FY 2005, thus far, as of January 2005. This food provides the bulk of daily nutritional needs for the IDPs and fosters protection for them, as they are not forced to leave the IDP camps to cultivate crops in outlying, unprotected areas. Without this assistance, these IDPs would be significantly more vulnerable to abductions, killings, and attacks by the LRA.

USAID programs also support training in psychosocial counseling for community, religious and traditional leaders, teachers, and others who have direct interaction with formerly abducted children. Other donors provide child and adult ex-abductees with resettlement kits and support the air and road transport of formerly abducted children returning to their home communities. USAID and other donors work with local NGOs to build their capacity in human rights, peace building and community resilience programming. For example, USAID provided funding for 50 paralegals to work in IDP camps, raise awareness of human rights, help resolve disputes, and refer human rights violations to higher authorities for appropriate redress. The Danish international development agency DANIDA and the Norwegian Refugee Council also supported programs to increase human rights awareness and advocacy among residents of IDP camps.

International donors have funded a variety of programs to address the needs of night commuters. UNICEF, for instance, supports night commuters with emergency shelter items and water and sanitation facilities. USAID/OFDA provided \$820,171 to GOAL, an NGO to construct protected shelters, sanitation facilities, water points, and security lighting for night commuters in Kalongo, in Pader district. These programs are designed to meet night commuter needs, without creating incentives to commute that weaken families and undermine social structures.

Donors also support programs to prevent and obtain redress for gender-based violence. One example is a \$369,916 USAID/OFDA grant to the Christian Children's Fund for a program to combat rape and sexual violence, and improve protection, in Lira District. Other programs encourage children, particularly girls, to remain in school and abstain from sex.

Summary of U.S. Assistance

Overall, the United States is a leading source of humanitarian and other assistance for the people of northern and eastern Uganda. The U.S. has provided over 50 percent of total WFP assistance in Uganda, including a contribution of \$56 million in FY 2004. We provided approximately \$12 million to support the reintegration of former child soldiers and formerly abducted persons, to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS in conflict-affected regions, and provide other non-emergency assistance. Additionally, the U.S. provided

approximately \$9 million in FY 2004 for emergency health and nutrition, water and sanitation, and food security programs. Total U.S. government assistance was over \$77 million. Government efforts were supplemented by private American contributions to faith-based and NGOs working in the conflict-affected areas.

Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act

Appendix: 2004 Chronology of LRA Activity

JANUARY

January 1, Gulu District

16 civilians including nine children were abducted during a night prayer at Lawii-Adul, Laliya Parish, Bungatira sub-county, Aswa County. (New Vision, 1/5)

Early January, Lira District

5 bodies of women suspected to have been abducted by LRA rebels on December 31, were recovered by the army at River Moroto. (New Vision, 1/6)

January 5, Pader District

11 bodies of civilians suspected to have been killed by LRA rebels were discovered by the army while pursuing the rebels at Kayo-Lalogi in Lapul sub-county. (Monitor, 1/6)

January 8, Lira District

5 bodies of civilians suspected to have been killed by LRA rebels were discovered by the UPDF at the bank of River Moroto, according to 2nd Lt. Chris Magezi, the Army's 5th Division spokesperson. (Monitor, 1/9)

January 12, Lira District

2 civilians were killed when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle at Yatamenya along Lira-Kotido Road. (New Vision, 1/16)

Mid January, Lira District

17 civilians were killed when LRA rebels attacked Teobwola village, Olumu sub-county, Otuke County. (New Vision, 1/20)

January 21, Lira District

9 civilians were killed after they were abducted by LRA rebels from Engwenya Trading Center and Acede Parish in Moroto County. Chris Magezi, The UPDF 5th Division Spokesperson confirmed the incident. (New Vision, 1/23)

January 25, Pader District

3 UPDF soldiers including a major were killed during an ambush by LRA rebels in Labuje village, Lukole sub-county in Agago County. (Monitor, 1/27)

January 28, Lira District

2 Amuka militiamen were killed and several others injured when they were attacked by LRA rebels at Amagu. Second Lt. Chris Magezi, 5th Division Spokesperson confirmed the incident. (New Vision, 1/31)

End January, Lira District

9 civilians were killed during an attack by LRA rebels in Abako sub-county. (Monitor, 1/24)

FEBRUARY

Early February, Kitgum

A Sudanese refugee was killed and four others injured when a group of LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle along the Padibe-Lokung Road. A rebel was killed during crossfire with UPDF soldiers on the truck. (New Vision, 2/18)

February 1, Lira District

8 women civilians who had been abducted by LRA rebels were beaten to death in Omoro sub-county, Moroto County. Omara Qunto, village council chairman for Anepmoroto confirmed the incident. (New Vision, 2/6)

February 2-3, Gulu District

14 civilians were killed when LRA rebels attacked Koch Ongako IDP camp in Omoro County. (Monitor, 2/5)

February 2, Gulu District

16 children were abducted when LRA rebels attacked a village in Anang near Gulu Town. (Monitor, 2/5)

February 4, Lira District

About 47 civilians were hacked to death and several others injured when LRA rebels attacked Abia IDP camp in Apala sub-County, Moroto County. (Monitor, 2/6)

February 5, Gulu District

Two civilians were injured and 20 others abducted when LRA rebels invaded Pece Division in Gulu Town. (New Vision, 2/10)

February 5, Gulu District

Two civilians were injured and 20 others abducted when LRA rebels invaded Pece Division in Gulu Town. (New Vision, 2/10)

February 6, Juba Southern Sudan

7 Sudanese militiamen were killed when LRA attacked Juba. 19 other persons were unaccounted for. (New Vision, 2/18)

February 7, Gulu District

20 civilians were abducted by LRA rebels from Pece-Pawel. The army killed a rebel while trying to repel them.
(NGO security update, 2/13)

February 7, Lira District

15 civilians were hacked to death when LRA rebels attacked Apatonyanga, Ojul Parish, Abako sub-County. (New Vision, 2/10)

February 8, Lira District

9 civilians were killed when LRA rebels raided Aliwang Trading Center. Sylvester Opira, Lira deputy Resident District Commissioner confirmed the incident saying the victims were in church when the rebels attacked.
(New Vision, 2/10)

February 9, Gulu District

Unspecified number of young boys were abducted by LRA rebels from Kasubi Village, near the main military barracks. (NGO security update, 2/13)

February 10, Uganda-Sudan Border

Security sources said 250 LRA rebels entered Uganda from Sudan through Palabek and Agoro.
(NGO security update, 2/13)

February 11, Gulu District

7 civilians were abducted and later released on February 14, when LRA rebels attacked Barogal in Pageya areas.
(NGO security update, 2/13)

February 11, Gulu District

Unconfirmed sources said 15 civilians were killed by LRA rebels in the western side of Cwero around Gulu-Pader border. (NGO security update, 2/13)

February 11, Gulu District

4 civilians were hacked to death and another injured by LRA rebels at Orapwoyo Village, Lalogi sub-county, Omoro County. (NGO security update, 2/13)

February 21, Lira District

A total of 192 civilians most of them babies and women were burned in their huts when LRA rebels raided Barlonyo IDP camp in Cuka Dek Orit parish in Ogur sub-county in Erute North constituency. (New Vision, 2/23) (Note. On March 17, the New Vision and Monitor newspapers quoted UNICEF Protection Officer for northern Uganda as saying that following investigations by local leaders, they found out that the death toll was much higher than initially reported. In addition to 237 civilians killed in the camp, local officials counted another 100 killed outside the camp. The "Monitor" of March 29 reported that the government couldn't account for an additional 259 civilians who are missing since the attack. End Note)

MARCH

Early March, Kampala

UPDF Spokesperson, Major Shaban Bantariza announced that the army would re-deploy in southern Sudan to fight the LRA rebels. This followed a 3-month extension to May 31 of a protocol of understanding agreement signed between the two countries. (Monitor, 3/14)

Early March, Nebbi

One civilian was killed and four others injured when suspected LRA rebels ambushed a lorry along Pakwach-Karuma road. Godfrey Jupamono, Acting District Police Commander confirmed the incident saying the rebels burned the lorry to ashes. (New Vision, 3/11)

March 7, Gulu

Over 50 civilians were abducted when LRA rebels raided Bardege zone about 4km from Gulu Town. Col. Nathan Mugisha, UPDF's 4th Division Commander confirmed the incident. (New Vision, 3/11)

March 13, Gulu

3 civilians were killed by suspected LRA rebels in Kilak County. (New Vision, 3/12)

March 13, Gulu

A civilian was killed by LRA rebels in Gulu Municipality. (New Vision, 3/12)

March 15, Katakwi District

9 civilians were hacked to death when LRA rebels raided Odelel Trading Center, Orungo sub-county. (Monitor, 3/17)

March 19, Pader district

12 civilians were killed and several others injured when LRA rebels attacked lira-Palwo IDP camp. (New Vision, 3/24)

March 24, Lira District

11 civilians were hacked to death when LRA rebels attacked Wici Oremo village in Apoka Parish, Ogur sub-county. (Monitor, 3/26)

March 25, Kitgum District

3 civilians were killed during an ambush by LRA rebels in Piwidi. (Monitor, 3/30)

End of March, Kitgum District

2 civilians were killed and six others injured when LRA rebels ambushed two vehicles in Mucwini sub-county.
(New Vision, 4/2)

March 30, Lira District

9 civilians were killed when LRA rebels attacked Aloi IDP Camp in Moroto County. The rebels also chopped off the lips and ears of a woman by the name of Sophie Apio.
(New Vision, 4/5)

APRIL

April 3, Lira District

7 people were killed including three civilians and four UPDF soldiers when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle at Abako, 50km from Lira Town. (NGO Humanitarian update-April)

April 5, Lira District

6 civilians were killed when LRA rebels attacked Abukamola Parish. (Monitor, 4/8)

April 14, Gulu-Adjumani Road

14 civilians including a UPDF soldier were killed and several others injured when LRA rebels ambushed two passenger vehicles at Pakirinya-Ayugi Bridge. (New Vision, 4/17)

April 15, Gulu District

One civilian was killed and several others were injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle and a passenger bus at Ayugi Bridge in Kilak County. (Monitor, 4/16)

April 16, Pader District

8 civilians were abducted by LRA rebels near Pader town. (NGO humanitarian update-April)

End April, Pader District

24 civilians were killed when LRA rebels attacked several sub-counties in Agago County. (Monitor, 4/30)

April 25, Kitgum District

18 civilians including six school-going children were abducted by LRA rebels near the Catholic mission. (NGO humanitarian update-April)

April 26, Kitgum District

6 civilians were abducted, five later released and 23 grass-thatched huts burned when LRA rebels attacked Amida IDP camp. (NGO Humanitarian update-April)

April 29, Gulu District

35 civilians were killed and 18 others injured when LRA rebels attacked Odek IDP camp in Omoro County. (New Vision, 5/2)

MAY

May 16, Gulu Town

39 civilians including 7 children were killed, 11 civilians injured and 100 grass-thatched huts burned when LRA rebels raided Pagak IDP camp near Gulu Town. (USAID Humanitarian Update, 6/22)

May 17, Pader District

5 civilians were killed and nine others injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle at Porogali village in Acholi-bur sub-county in Aruu County. (New Vision, 5/19)

May 17, Kitgum District

2 civilians were killed and several others injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle at Mucwini sub-county in Chua County. (New Vision, 5/19)

May 18, Kitgum District

11 civilians including Rt. Rev. Benjamin Ojwang, the Anglican Bishop, were abducted when LRA rebels attacked Mican village in the outskirts of Kitgum Town. (Monitor, 5/20)

May 20, Gulu District

41 civilians were killed and several others were injured when LRA rebels attacked Lukodi IDP camp in Bungatira sub-county, Aswa County. (USAID Humanitarian Update, 6/22)

May 28, Gulu District

2 civilians were hacked to death and 17 others were abducted when LRA rebels raided Gweno-twom village in Alokulum Parish in Omoro County. (New Vision, 5/31)

May 29, Gulu District

Rwot Yakobo Oyaka, the traditional chief of Alokulum in Omoro County, abducted with 17 other civilians by LRA rebels May 28, was rescued by the army. Among the rescued was also a three-month old child. (New Vision, 5/31)

JUNE

June 2, Gulu District

A civilian was killed and twenty others briefly abducted when LRA rebels raided Goma IDP camp in Nwoya County. (New Vision, 6/4)

June 3, Kitgum District

23 people including two UPDF soldiers were killed and 20 others injured when LRA rebels raided Kalabong IDP camp in Namukora sub-county, Chwua County. (USAID Humanitarian Update, 6/22)

June 7, Pader District

2 civilians were killed when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle near Pader Town. (New Vision, 6/9)

June 8, Southern Sudan

41 people were reportedly killed and several others injured when LRA rebels attacked Lomega, Lokiliri, Goke and Nisitu villages in southern Sudan. (New Vision.6/10)

June 11, Kitgum District

A civilian was killed and two others injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle in Lukung Sub-County. (New Vision, 6/12)

June 8, Apac District

25 civilians were killed, several others injured, 26 abducted and 600 grass-thatched huts burned when LRA rebels raided Abok IDP camp in Otwal sub-County, Oyam North County. (USAID, Humanitarian Update, 6/22)

June 8, Gulu District

4 civilians were killed and 200 huts grass-thatched huts burned when LRA rebels raided a village near Opit forest in Omoro County. (New Vision, 6/10)

June 9, Gulu District

2 civilians were killed and three others injured when LRA rebels ambushed a lorry at Patalira in Patiko Sub-County, Aswa County. UPDF northern region Spokesperson Lt. Paddy Akunda confirmed the incident. (New Vision, 6/11)

June 18, Gulu District

6 civilians were killed and nine others injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle near Aswa Bridge. (New Vision, 6/22)

Mid June, Kitgum District

3 civilians including the LC I chief of Ngomoromo Village were killed in two separate incidents in Lukung and Padibe sub-counties. (New Vision, 6/14)

June 15, Southern Sudan

2 people were killed including a UPDF soldier when LRA rebels ambushed a Rapid Response food convoy belonging to Christian Relief Services (CRS)-Sudan. (USAID, Humanitarian Update 6/22)

June 15, Apac District

A civilian was killed and eight others abducted when LRA rebels raided Onek-Gwok Parish in Ngai Sub-County. (Monitor, 6/18)

June 19, Kitgum District

2 civilians were killed and two others injured when LRA rebels ambushed two vehicles at Abakadak Primary School near Padibe Trading Center along Lukung Road. (New Vision, 6/21)

June 25-27, Southern Sudan

122 Sudanese were killed and 4,000 displaced during raids by LRA on several villages at Gangala near the Government garrison position of Jebel Mille. The Equatoria Defense Forces, a militia group allied to SPLA alleged LRA was supported by the Khartoum Government and Kor Englizi. (New Vision, 7/8)

JULY

July 2, Kitgum District

2 civilians were killed when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle near Paluga. (Justice and Peace Newsletter, 7/04)

July 4, Pader District

2 civilians were killed when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle in Pader. (Justice and Peace Newsletter, 7/04)

July 4, Lira District

4 people were killed including a UPDF soldier and seven others injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle between the villages of Ikwe and Baralegi bordering Olilim and Okwang sub-counties in Otuoke County. (New Vision, 7/8)

July 5, Pader District

A police constable was killed and four others injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle at Labongo-Dero village, Lira-Palwo sub-county. (New Vision, 7/7)

July 7, Lira District

4 civilians were killed when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle in Okwang sub-County. The rebels also burned the vehicle. (Monitor, 7/12)

July 10, Lira

11 civilians including four children were killed when LRA rebels attacked Apungi village, Abia Parish, Apala sub-county, Erute North Constituency. Several other civilians were abducted and later escaped. (New Vision, 7/13)

July 22, Lira District

4 people including a one-year child were killed during a raid by LRA rebels near Apala IDP camp in Barr sub-county. (New Vision, 7/29)

July 23, Southern Sudan

40 people were killed, including seven SPLA fighters and a church leader, when LRA rebels attacked Moti village, 50km from Juba. (Monitor, 7/26)

July 28, Kitgum District

5 civilians were killed when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle at Obem Village, Labongo Oryem sub-county. (Monitor, 8/2)

Mid July, Apac District

4 people including three UPDF soldiers and one Amuka militia were killed when LRA rebels attacked Ojwii Parish, Otwal sub-count, Oyam North Constituency. (New Vision, 7/17)

July 28, Southern Sudan

An estimated 200 LRA abductees and combatants were killed in a UPDF raid on Kony's base camp. Kony narrowly escapes. (NGO Security Update, July)

July 31, Pader District

3 passengers were killed when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle on the Lira-Kitgum Road, Aruu County. (8/4)

AUGUST

August 2, Southern Sudan

4 Sudanese civilians were killed when LRA rebels attacked Kurangerebe IDP camp in southern Sudan. (New Vision, 8/7)

August 4, Pader District

3 civilians were injured when a vehicle was ambushed by LRA rebels at Payola. (Monitor, 8/12)

August 9, Pader District

3 civilians were killed when a vehicle was ambushed by LRA rebels along Pader Kitgum Road. (Red Pepper, 8/13)

August 15, Lira District

A civilian was killed and many others including a UPDF soldier were injured in a rebel ambush at Baralegi along Okwang-Barlonyo Road. (Monitor, 8/21)

August 16, Lira District

2 civilians were killed and four others injured including a member of the Local Defense Unit (LDU) in a rebel ambush at Acan Pii in Olilim sub-county. (Monitor, 8/19)

August 24, Kitgum District

2 civilians were killed when LRA rebels attacked Palabek Gem village, Palabek Sub County, Lamwo County. (NGO Security update 8/24-30)

August 25, Kitgum District

2 civilians were killed, four others abducted and 25 grass thatched huts burned when LRA rebels attacked a village in Lolwa Parish, Orom Sub County. (NGO Security update 8/24-30)

August 27, Kitgum District

A civilian was killed when LRA rebels attacked Tuluku on Padibe Road, 6km from Kitgum Town. (NGO Security update 8/24-30)

August 27, Pader District

3 civilians were killed and ten others abducted when LRA rebels attacked Aware and Lira Palwo Sub Counties. (NGO Security update 8/24-30)

August 29, Pader District

A civilian was killed and five others were injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle at Patongo Trading Center. (Monitor, 9/4)

August 31, Pader District

2 civilians were killed and eight others were injured when LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle at Namukora. (Monitor, 9/4)

SEPTEMBER

Early September, Kitgum District

5 civilians were killed in an ambush by LRA rebels between the sub-counties of Paluga and Madi-Opei in Lamwo County. (Monitor, 9/15)

September 11, Kitgum

A civilian was killed in crossfire between UPDF soldiers and LRA rebels in Labongo-Layamo sub-county, Chua County. (New Vision, 9/14)

September 13, Apac District

5 people including three civilians, a UPDF soldier and one rebel were killed during crossfire in Iceme sub-county. (Monitor, 9/14)

Mid September, Apac District

4 people were killed after they were abducted by LRA rebels in Tecwao village in Lalogi sub-county. (Monitor, 9/14)

September 21, Kitgum District

2 civilians were killed when LRA rebels ambushed their vehicle at Lomura village, Padibe West sub-county. (New Vision, 9/24)

September 24, Pader District

2 UPDF soldiers were killed when LRA rebels ambushed their motorcycle in Awere sub-county. (New Vision, 9/27)

OCTOBER

Early October, Gulu District

3 people were abducted when LRA rebels raided the outskirts of Koch Goma camp. One of the captives was released after the rebels cut off his lips and fingers. (New Vision, 10/11)

October 2, Kitgum District

4 civilians were killed and three others were injured when LRA rebels ambushed a truck between Lokung and Aweno-Alwiyo in Lamwo County. (New Vision, 10/5)

NOVEMBER

November 4, Lira District

4 civilians were killed and six others injured when LRA rebels ambushed two vehicles on Achanpii-Obalanga Road. (New Vision, 11/6)

November 7, Katakwi District

3 people including a young boy were abducted when LRA rebels attacked Alito parish, Obalanga sub-county in a new offensive. UPDF rescued the women. The boy, however, remains unaccounted for. (Security Sources in Teso, 11/9)

November 9, Kitgum District

A civilian was killed and two others were injured when LRA rebels ambushed their vehicle between Agoro and Madi-Opeinsub-counties in Lamwo County. (Monitor, 11/15)

November 12, Kumi

2 civilians were killed in an ambush laid by suspected LRA rebels in Kumi District. (New Vision, 11/14)

November 14, 2004

President Museveni declared a seven-day ceasefire with the LRA rebels in parts of Acholi, covering north of Patiko, west of Palabek, east of Atiak, and up to the Sudan border. (New Vision, 11/15)

November 23, Gulu District

2 civilians were killed and 11 others abducted when LRA rebels raided Pata-Lira Village, Patiko sub-county, Aswa County. (Monitor, 11/25)

November 25, Kampala

The government extended the ceasefire for seven days to allow LRA rebels gather in the demarcated areas of the ceasefire zone. (New Vision, 11/04)

DECEMBER

December 7, Kampala

President Museveni extended the ceasefire in the north from December 7-15. The designated area for the rebels to gather was redefined from 300 sq km to 100 sq km in Kitgum District. (New Vision, 12/8)

December 10, Southern Sudan

7 civilians including four children and three women were hacked to death by LRA rebels in Rejaf village near Juba Town. (Monitor, 12/17)

December 18, Kampala

President Museveni for the third time extended the ceasefire in the north (December 15-31), to allow the rebels to consult on some of the contentious issues. (New Vision, 12/18)

December 19, Pader District

2 civilians including an LC III chairman were killed and another injured when LRA rebels ambushed their vehicle between Lagile village and Corner Rac-Kiko in Awere sub-County, Aruu County. (New Vision, 12/21)

December 22, Southern Sudan

A Sudanese civilian was killed and two others captured when LRA rebels raided an SPLA camp, east of Nimule, along River Aswa. Col. Nathan Mugisha, UPDF's 4th Division Commander confirmed the incident. (New Vision, 12/27)

(9) urge the Government of Uganda to improve the professionalism of Ugandan military personnel currently stationed in northern and eastern Uganda, with an emphasis on respect for human rights, accountability for abuses, and effective civilian protection;

(10) work with the international community to assist institutions of civil society in Uganda to increase the capacity of such institutions to monitor the human rights situation in northern Uganda and to raise awareness of abuses of human rights that occur in that area;

(11) urge the Government of Uganda to permit international human rights monitors to establish a presence in northern and eastern Uganda;

(12) monitor the creation of civilian militia forces in northern and eastern Uganda and publicize any concerns regarding the recruitment of children into such forces or the potential that the establishment of such forces will invite increased targeting of civilians in the conflict or exacerbate ethnic tension and violence; and

(13) make clear that the relationship between the Government of Sudan and the Government of the United States cannot improve unless no credible evidence indicates that authorities of the Government of Sudan are complicit in efforts to provide weapons or other support to the Lord's Resistance Army.

SEC. 4. REPORT.

(a) **REQUIREMENTS.**—Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the conflict in Uganda.

(b) **CONTENT.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall include a description of the following:

(1) The individuals or entities that are providing financial and material support for the Lord's Resistance Army, including a description of any such support provided by the Government of Sudan or by senior officials of such Government.

(2) The activities of the Lord's Resistance Army that create obstacles that prohibit the provision of humanitarian assistance or the protection of the civilian population in Uganda.

(3) The practices employed by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces in northern and eastern Uganda to ensure that children and civilians are protected, that civilian complaints are addressed, and that any member of the armed forces that abuses a civilian is held accountable for such abuse.

(4) The actions carried out by the Government of the United States, the Government of Uganda, or the international community to protect civilians, especially women and children, who have been displaced by the conflict in Uganda, including women and children that leave their homes and flee to cities and towns at night in search of security from sexual exploitation and gender-based violence.

(c) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means