Verbatim, as delivered
March 18, 2009
Chairman Berman’s opening statement at hearing,
“Striking the Appropriate Balance: the Defense Department’s Expanding Role in
Foreign Assistance”
I’d like to welcome our
distinguished panel of witnesses today for the third in a series of hearings
that the Committee will convene on foreign assistance reform. In the last Congress, the Full Committee held
two hearings addressing this issue, and our subcommittees held several
others.
One observation that repeatedly came
up during those hearings was the Defense Department’s increasing role in
foreign assistance.
We have heard the same explanation
for this over and over again: DoD
is filling a vacuum left by the State Department and USAID, which lack the
capacity to carry out their diplomatic and development functions.
There is no doubt that these
agencies have been weakened by a severe shortage of resources.
For example, USAID has only about
2,500 permanent staff today, compared to 4,300 in 1975. The agency is responsible for overseeing
hundreds of infrastructure projects around the world, yet employs only five
engineers. They have only 29 education
specialists to monitor programs in 87 countries.
Likewise, the State Department lacks
resources to fill critical diplomatic posts.
Today, the agency has a 12% vacancy rate in overseas Foreign Service positions, and an even higher vacancy rate here in the
President Obama’s fiscal year 2010
international affairs budget request – which I strongly support, and I hope my
colleagues will, too – represents an important step
forward in addressing these weaknesses.
And for our part, the Committee
plans to tackle these troubling capacity issues when we take up the State
Department authorization bill and foreign assistance reform legislation later
this year.
But beyond capacity and resources,
there are some deeper issues I’d like to examine today.
Is providing military assistance to
a foreign country a foreign policy decision that should be the primary
responsibility of civilian agencies, with appropriate Defense Department
involvement in implementation? Or is it
a national security mission that should be planned and carried out by the Pentagon?
Does DoD have such a comparative advantage in performing
certain non-traditional defense missions that it should be carrying out
activities previously reserved for civilian agencies?
And what are the implications of
putting a military face on development and humanitarian activities? How does this affect the way we are viewed in
the world, and what is the practical impact on USAID’s
ability to carry out development projects?
The Department of Defense has always
played an important role in carrying out certain security assistance
activities, particularly implementing military training and military sales
directed by the Department of State.
However, DoD’s role significantly expanded in the context of
And beyond those two conflicts, the
Pentagon began requesting – and receiving -- authority to conduct similar
activities in other parts of the world. DoD’s goal was to address
irregular security threats on a global scale -- threats they argued did not fit
neatly into traditional State or Defense Department missions, and thus required
new tools of engagement.
These include global train and equip
authority, also known as the Section 1206 program; a world-wide stabilization
and reconstruction fund, also know as the Section 1207 program; and numerous
new training programs directly managed by the Defense Department.
In addition, some existing
authorities were expanded, including the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund
and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Assistance.
DoD’s argument that these programs are
justified by “military necessity” should be given significant deference. Indeed, I can think of many situations in
which it might make sense for military commanders to get involved in activities
that – in peacetime – would be considered foreign assistance.
However, many questions remain
regarding the utility and implications of such programs. For example, on several occasions this
Committee has raised concerns about the use of Section 1206 funds.
In some cases, it appears they’ve
been used for programs with only a tenuous link to counterterrorism. In others, it looks more like a traditional
diplomatic tool designed to curry influence with potential friends.
In the development context, critics
have argued that DoD’s role
erases the distinction between military personnel and civilians carrying out similar
development activities, ignores development best practices such as
sustainability and effectiveness, and puts a military face on inherently
civilian programs.
It can also result in waste, fraud,
and abuse, which has been well documented by the Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Interestingly, in a letter attached
to a report submitted last week on one of DoD’s
international programs, the Pentagon stated, “Humanitarian assistance
activities continue to provide significant peacetime engagement opportunities
for Combatant Commanders and
The question remains: Shouldn’t our
“peacetime engagement” efforts be carried out by USAID, our nation’s premier
development agency? And should our
military be responsible for performing the mission of civilian agencies? Do we really want to ask the men and women
who go to war to do the mission of both Defense and State?
Some have suggested that a National
Development Strategy would serve as a useful mechanism to help coordinate and
establish appropriate roles for various agencies that provide foreign
assistance. One of our witnesses
supports such a strategy in her written statement.
I welcome this hearing today as an
opportunity to shed light on the many important questions surrounding the
military’s growing role in foreign assistance.