COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Donald A. Manzullo (IL-16), Ranking Member

Opening Statement

October 25, 2007

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the Six Party Talks process. I want to take this opportunity to welcome Chris Hill to Congress yet again, and to commend him for making Capitol Hill outreach a priority. So, let me begin by saying “thank you” for your tireless efforts.

The complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a goal that we must all support. The Six Party Talks process, which in addition to the United States and North Korea, includes Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia, is a good framework for such a sensitive topic. I commend the Administration for taking this measured, deliberate, and multilateral approach. Now, we are at the critical Phase Two juncture where the future of the talks is very much at stake.

I have reviewed both the February 13^th Agreement and the October 3^rd Joint Statement in detail. Both agreements are vague in terms of a detailed timeline and specific commitments. The February 13^th agreement called for North Korea to freeze its nuclear facility at Yongbyon (YONG BEE ON) and to invite international monitors back into the country to monitor the freeze. Bilateral discussions, in the form of five working groups, were also to commence. In exchange for these actions, the February agreement called for the United States to provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. I note that the State Department has notified Congress about the funding needed to purchase this oil. I also note that an American-led team has recently returned from North Korea, and another one is scheduled to return in the near future.

Mr. Chairman, much has been said about the quality of the February agreement and the October statement. The Phase Two implementation plan raises a lot of questions that I hope our distinguished witness will address. I understand that we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, but knowing full well the bizarre regime in North Korea is unreliable, we’ve got to get this agreement right from the start with solid verification mechanisms in place. But there are still many important questions that the people we represent will want answered. For example, how do we verify that the upcoming declaration by North Korea regarding its nuclear programs will be truthful and complete? There currently is no verification mechanism in the agreement that allows for widespread inspections inside the country. How will we know that the regime has not hidden more nuclear material somewhere else in the mountainous regions of North Korea? Also, will the Administration remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list even if there is not significant progress on resolving the kidnapping of Japanese citizens? Finally, the question of whether North Korea is continuing to engage in proliferation activities is most troubling. The Administration’s decision to limit access to information concerning Israel’s strike in Syria is a cause for concern.

The complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea is such an important matter that we should take all deliberate efforts to ensure that this is done right. What is at stake here is nothing less than world peace. But what we do not want is a repeat of the past where agreements are broken. I commend our witness for tackling such an important job, and I want to assure him that his efforts are for the broader good.