House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade
Prepared Statement
William J. Lowell
Managing Director,
July 26, 2007
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Please permit me to commend you, Ranking
Member Royce and other Members of the Sub-Committee for convening this hearing
today, which concerns matters of genuine importance and urgency.
I think the questions the Subcommittee is raising are
exactly the right ones: Are we doing
what needs to be done to ensure our technology does not fall into the wrong
hands; and are we taking appropriate steps to facilitate technology sharing
where this furthers our interests.
Before summarizing where I believe the main
problems lie in this area, I think it is important to state what is not a
problem. I am referring to the comprehensive
framework set forth in the Arms Export Control Act for controlling transfers of
armaments and related technology. This statutory
framework ensures crucial oversight by Congress and has served our country’s
security and foreign policy interests well over the years. I think it is no exaggeration to say that, if
other governments had similar frameworks in place, we might be dealing with
significantly more favorable security situations in various trouble spots
around the world. A corollary of this,
in my view, is that the United States should be providing leadership in the
effort to strengthen international control of armaments –- not retreating from
leadership through proposals to water down our own system, or undercutting our
leadership by administering our system in such a difficult manner as to
discourage even our closest allies.
There are three,
interrelated problems challenging our arms export control system today. In my view, they all arise with the Executive
Branch’s administration – or, in part, the lack of proper administration – of
various authorities granted by Congress under the Arms Export Control Act.
(1) Failure to Assess and Reorient Controls against
Terrorist Threats
Despite repeated urgings from Congress -- and two detailed
reports by the Government Accountability Office[1]
-- there has been no review in the Executive Branch, even at this late date, of
whether our export controls should be tightened in some areas (or loopholes
closed in others) to deal with the heightened terrorist threat.
There is ample information about this threat,
including an important study released by the National Intelligence Council in
December 2004, forecasting that terrorists will continue to rely primarily on
conventional weapons in the coming years -- but will also move up the
technology ladder to include advanced explosives, unmanned aerial vehicles and
other items of the type controlled on the U.S. Munitions List by State. If we needed a more recent reminder, just
last Sunday during his interview on “Meet the Press” Admiral McConnell pointed
to concerns about terrorist sleeper cells in the United States and al Qaeda’s continued
primary interest in explosives that generate mass casualties.
Mr. Chairman, to my knowledge, our export control
programs are the only part of our overall national security structure that has
not been subjected to a post-9/11 security review. Why the agencies continue to assert – as an
article of faith, rather than rigorous assessment – that our programs in this
area are sound and immune from exploitation is mystifying and dangerous.
(2) Systemic Vulnerabilities and Risks to
For the first time in history, Executive Branch
programs related to export control and protection of critical military
technology have been placed in GAO’s “high risk” list. This is not just a dubious distinction; it is
a flashing red light signaling that many things are wrong – and it comes at an
inopportune time.
GAO has spelled out in a series of reports since
9/11 all of the corrective actions needed to resolve problems related to those
vulnerabilities. The problems cover the
waterfront, from clarifying export license requirements for missile technologies
to providing reasonable assurance that anti-tamper systems in
Given Ms. Calvaresi-Barr’s presence at today’s
hearing, there is no need for me to elaborate on the magnitude of the problems
in this area -- except to note that the very fact of the high risk designation
impeaches any assurance by the Executive Branch that the programs it
administers pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act are functioning effectively
to safeguard U.S. interests.
(3) Declining Levels of Service for
Flat resources at State[2]
in the face of an increase in license applications represent only one part of
the problem and one that is easily resolved for not a great deal of money. The other, more intractable part is the
Department of State’s strategy for solving this problem.[3] It is a strategy that appears to imply an air
of indifference to legitimate concerns of exporters and one that is committed to
reducing the backlog of license applications chiefly by redefining the mission
to eliminate export license requirements.
There are problems with such a strategy on multiple
levels. For one thing, increases in
license applications of the magnitude reported by State (i.e., six-to-eight
percent per annum) generally correlate to a growing share of the international
arms market by
Importance of Congressional Oversight
Mr. Chairman, the Congress and the American people
are entitled to a high degree of confidence that:
(1) Important
(2) This area of national security policy is being thoughtfully and
fully integrated into
(3) Legitimate defense trade with our friends and allies is being
furthered through timely and efficient adjudication of export license
applications submitted by
Unfortunately, there are serious reasons for
concern in all of these matters. The
solutions are not expensive and are attainable in the near term. They do not involve any massive
re-engineering of the arms export control process at State, which has already
become something of a reinvention lab in recent years. But, the solutions do require a commitment by
the Department of State to administer the system provided in the Arms Export
Control Act responsibly and effectively.
They will also require expanded oversight by Congress, at least in the
near term to ensure this is done.
That is why I think it would be very helpful for
either the Subcommittee or the full Committee as the leadership deems most
appropriate to designate several Members who will work intensively with senior
management from State on a work plan to:
These are the priorities areas that
need to be addressed, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion. In focusing on these urgent matters, I do not
mean to imply we should exclude eventual consideration by Congress of
well-designed proposals that promote cooperation with allies while preserving
credible means for the U.S. Government to safeguard our systems, and deter, detect
and prosecute violations when they occur.
But, I am persuaded the primary focus
at this juncture should be on getting the arms export control system back on
some reasonable footing and dealing effectively with existing security threats
and system vulnerabilities. Accomplishing
these tasks is well within the grasp of the U.S. Government and should not
prove to be vexing or protracted provided there is a good faith effort to do
so.
I thank you, Sir.
[1] GAO, Defense
Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post-9/11 Environment, GAO-05-234 (
[2] The U.S. Government spent $67 million in FY 2005 controlling slightly more than one
billion dollars in dual use goods and technology licensed by the Commerce
Department. In contrast, only $11
million was spent in the same year controlling $54 billion in defense articles
and services licensed by State.
[3] GAO’s report (GAO-05-234) supra suggests that the Department did
not execute a funding authorization to hire additional licensing officers
beginning in FY 2003 in order to expedite munitions export licensing and,
instead, planned a reduction in the number of licensing officers over the next
two fiscal years.