TESTIMONY FOR DR. ESTHER BRIMMER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND DIRECTOR FO RESEARCH
THE CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
THE JOHNS HOPKINS
UNVIERSITY
PAUL H.
NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT
JUNE 11, 2008
Thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and
Oversight and the opportunity to comment on the draft report, “The Decline in America’s
Reputation: Why?” prepared by the Subcommittee.
The report is a welcome addition
to the analysis of America’s
role in the world. As the report
explains, in recent years the United
States has experienced a significant decline
in its international reputation. This is
a significant shift in international affairs.
In my testimony, I shall focus on
the impact of that decline in two areas, on America’s relations with European
countries and on its ability to work in multilateral organizations. As the Subcommittee’s report notes there has
been “a 26 point increase in Europe of the view that U.S. leadership is
undesirable.” While all eight of the
Subcommittee’s findings on “What Do They Think, and Why?” are salient, point
three is particularly relevant to the transatlantic relationship. Point three states, “It’s the perception of
hypocrisy” borne of “disappointment and bitterness.” Europeans are particularly saddened by the
perception that the United States
does not want to follow certain international rules and norms that the U.S. itself
helped establish. This disappointment
stems from the second point the report highlights; “It’s the policies” that
distance the United States from many its closet friends and allies. This view is also found in many international
organizations. The U.S. helped
create the network of international organizations that it too often seems to
ignore.
The challenges faced by the United States
in working with Europeans and in international organizations are especially
poignant because in these environments American participation is still seen as
vital. Although relations within Europe
and across the Atlantic are changing, the United States is still seen as a
key member of the Euro-Atlantic community.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) still binds twenty-six
countries in a collective defense arrangement.
The twenty-seven members of the European Union are developing a complex
political system with security elements, but they recognize that relations with
the United States
are vitally important to the European Union.
Europeans and North Americans debate the ways in which transatlantic
relations should develop in future, but not because they consider the issue
unimportant, rather because such relations are so important economically,
socially and politically.
The Impact on America’s
Relations with Europe
Relations with Europe are a
fundamental aspect of the foreign affairs of the United States. The U.S.,
Canada
and twenty-four European countries maintain the strongest military alliance in
the world, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United
States and Europe are
closely linked economically. The
transatlantic economy is worth over $3 trillion; over 14 million jobs in the U.S. and Europe
derive from this vital economic relationship.
As noted in previous hearings,
most Europeans want to work with a United States that would like to be
a responsible partner. They are not
averse to the United States itself, but to policies that they see as
antithetical to our values of human rights and judicial due process such as
rendition of suspects to third countries with harsh interrogation methods and
holding prisoners at Guantanamo.
The decline in America’s reputation in Europe
includes three key elements:
- Dislike of American unilateralism
- Disappointment with America not living up to its
own values
- Disagreement with the Administration’s perception of
international affairs
As the Subcommittee report
explains, one of the most important factors in Europe
is a dislike of what is perceived American unilateralism. From rejection of global opinion on climate
change to the invasion of Iraq,
the Administration’s policies reinforce the notion that the United States
holds itself above the law and separate from the rules that it argues should
apply to other nations. Repeatedly over
the past few years I have heard European experts who would otherwise support
strong relations with the U.S.
bemoan policies that hold the U.S.
separate from the family of nations. The
internal U.S.
debate on these issues is often not fully appreciated in other countries. Instead, some outsider observers think that
Americans assume that they should be above international norms and do not need
to consult with partners. This
assumption is particularly egregious for Europeans. The United States is formally allied
with many European countries and is a close partner of many others. As allies, Europeans expect to be consulted
on strategic issues of concern to the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole. Leaders in many allied countries share U.S. concern with fighting terrorism, supporting
human rights, and bringing stability to Afghanistan, but think
international cooperation is necessary. Europeans
are disappointed in the United
States not living up to the very values that
they purport to share. Renditions, poor
conduct at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq,
and holding prisoners in Guantanamo
all deepen European disappointment.
Among European observers, changes in policy could help rehabilitate the
reputation of the U.S.
European leaders disagree with
the direction in which some American leaders seem to want to go towards a world
in which international rules do not apply to the most powerful state, not only
in extreme situations, but in normal times. They are concerned that the U.S.
no longer wants to support international rules and norms as desirable ways to
manage international society, but instead sees them as constraints.
These concerns underpin the
decline of America’s
reputation in Europe, which in turn undermines the ability of the United States
to advance its interests. I will
highlight the following examples:
- Erosion of European public support for NATO
- Weakened ability to manage the alliance
- Initial reluctance to cooperate with the United States
on data collection
Public support for NATO. After 9/11, for the first time ever, NATO
invoked Article 5, the collective defense clause of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Article 5 states in part,
The Parties agree
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
NATO allies pledged support. For eight months afterwards, NATO AWAC
airplanes scanned the skies over the United States to help guard against
another terrorist attack using aircraft.
The NATO allies saw the campaign to strike al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and
end the repressive Taliban regime that harbored the terrorist group responsible
for 9/11 as a legitimate endeavor.
European countries wanted to help the U.S.
effort in Afghanistan. In late 2001, many observers were impressed
that the U.S.
waited several weeks to plan and execute a strike on al-Qaeda after the 9/11
attack. In early 2002, European leaders
wanted to the U.S. to engage
NATO more in Afghanistan.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq changed
that sentiment. European publics and
many European leaders opposed the invasion.
Five years of war in Iraq
have undermined support and even understanding of U.S.
objectives in Afghanistan. European publics tend to lump the two together. The Administration’s reckless war in Iraq eroded European support for the campaign in
Afghanistan. Sustained international action in Afghanistan
would have been difficult anyway. After
all, Afghanistan
has long history of resisting outsiders from the British in the nineteenth century
to the Russians in the late twentieth.
The country has been wracked by decades of war and poverty. Yet not only is the Afghan campaign hard on
the ground, it is hard on the alliance.
On reason for this difficulty is the erosion of European respect for the
policies currently pursued by the Administration leading the U.S.
Managing the NATO alliance. Although the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is an alliance of equals, the United States has always played a
leadership role. Leadership involves
diplomacy. Over the decades the United States
has usually advanced its initiatives within the alliance through
persuasion. One of the most important
initiatives within NATO has been the expansion of membership. Founded in 1949, over the past six decades
the alliance has accepted new members as policymakers strove to enhance the
security of the West. NATO was the United States
first permanent peacetime alliance.
Forged during the Cold War, rather than a shooting war, it bolstered the
security of the West.
After the end of the Cold War the
alliance accepted members from the former Warsaw Pact. Membership in NATO has helped erase the many
of the legacies of the Cold War. Both
Presidents Bush, senior and current, and President Bill Clinton all haled the
goal of “Europe whole and free.” During the Cold War some member states were
not yet democracies such as Portugal
(a founding member in 1949) and Turkey
(admitted in 1952). Yet now all NATO
members are democracies. Applicant
countries need to accept and meet rigorous standards for membership including
democratic control of the military. The United States
has been a long-standing supporter of Central and Eastern European countries’
desires to join the alliance. As the
Subcommittee’s report explains, U.S.
standing in Easter Europe remains higher than in Western
Europe as a result of memories of American support for people
behind the Iron Curtain.
Engagement with Euro-Atlantic
organizations has been fundamental to solidifying peace and security in Central
and Eastern Europe after the Cold War. One fact of this process is finding ways for
the troubled Balkans region to build a peaceful future. In the 1995 Dayton Accords, the United States
and European countries agreed that a European vocation, moving towards the
European Union, was a key component for integrating Balkan countries in to a
stable international order. For those
states who wish to meet the criteria, joining NATO is another aspect of finding
a more stable and secure future. the Republic of Macedonia joined NATO’s Membership
Action Plan (MAP) to in 1999. For nine
years, Macedonia
labored to meet the NATO standards.
Along with Albania
and Croatia, the country was
expected to be invited to join NATO at the Bucharest summit in April 2008. However, Macedonia has been plagued by a
controversy about its name. Neighboring Greece strongly objects to the use of the name “Macedonia” as it is close to the name of a
province internal to Greece. Some assert that Skopje’s use of the name hides territorial
designs on Greek land. For years many
countries would use the term “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” or
FYROM. The U.S. Department of State now uses
the name “Republic
of Macedonia.”
Macedonia had completed all the
substantive criteria for membership in the most important Euro-Atlantic
security organization, but was not invited to the next step at the April 2008
NATO summit because the name issue could not be resolved in time. Accepting states into NATO who have met the
conditions has been a fundamental goal of the United States across decades. Yet the United States could not persuade
its NATO allies to encourage one member to overcome its objection to the name
of another state. This was not a
situation in which the allies disagreed on whether a certain state should be
admitted. If the standing of the United States were higher in Europe, it might
have been better able to work with its allies to find a solution that enabled Macedonia
to be admitted into the alliance for which it had qualified.
Reluctance to cooperate with
the U.S. For the pat seven
years, the Administration has placed fighting international terrorism at the
top of its international agenda. I was
in the audience in Bucharest
when President Bush addressed a group of transatlantic experts and young
leaders on the eve of the most recent NATO summit. When outlining his priorities for the alliance
in Bucharest,
President Bush asserted that “The most important responsibility of NATO is the
collective security of our citizens.” He
went on to stress the role of fighting terrorism as an important task for the alliance. One of the most productive areas of
transatlantic cooperation after 9/11 has been law enforcement cooperation. The regular, legal channels for transatlantic
cooperation can work well. The United States
would like to work constructively with other counties. One would expect such cooperation to be
closest among countries that share values and legal standards. Yet Europeans’ doubts about America’s commitment to civil
liberties have undermined even this area of cooperation.
Liberal democracies face
challenges when endeavoring to manage civil liberties and the anti-terrorist
campaign. The decline in international
perceptions of America’s
standing on human rights hurt the country’s ability to work with partners on
law enforcement cooperation, in particular on developing data protection
norms. Transatlantic cooperation in this
vital area would have been difficult, but the decline in America’s reputation made it even
harder. Even before 9/11 the European
Union had different regulations than the U.S. The European Commission’s Directive on Data
Protection was launched in 1998. Whereas, the EU placed greater limits on the
transfer of personal information, the U.S. had permitted the compilation
of information by private entities which had encouraged the spread of various
Internet businesses.
The Administration argued that it
needed to be able to exchange information with other law enforcement agencies
to advance the anti-terrorism campaign.
Yet initial U.S.
forays were met with skepticism. The United States proposed exchanging detailed
information on passengers traveling to the United States. What data could be collected and how it
could be used has been a contentious issue across the Atlantic. Diplomacy and debate about passenger names
records (PNR) continued for years. Europeans were worried about what data the U.S.
would collect on European citizens, how long it would be held and who would
have access to it. The erosion of civil
liberties at home affected international interest in working with us. If we do not seem to value adequately the
civil liberties of our own citizens, foreign observers could be worried that we
would not respect their rights either.
This unease could make Europeans who value law enforcement cooperation,
cautious when working with the U.S.,
which could undermine the quality of that cooperation.
The decline in America’s reputation has an impact
on its ability to undertake cooperative anti-terrorism measures with some of
its close allies. Senior officials have
had to make an effort to reassure even close partners. As the State Department noted, on May 14,
2007, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff had to “reach
out to members of the European Parliament and the media in Brussels in effort to
allay European concerns about the collection of airline passenger data as part
of the U.S.
fight against terrorism.”
The decline in America’s standing among its
European allies and partners seems to be accelerating a process underway within
the transatlantic relationship.
Europeans are becoming more assertive within the transatlantic
relationship. In a sense this is a mark
of success. One of the fundamental
foreign policy objectives of the United States for six decades has
been to support the reemergence of peaceful, stable liberal democratic states
on the European continent. NATO has
provided the defensive framework and the evolving European Union has offered a
political system that has enabled European states to thrive. The end of the
Cold War and different views of the relative importance of challenges such as
international terrorism or climate change, would have strained the
transatlantic alliance. Yet, the
alliance has withstood significant strains in the past, such as during the
Vietnam War. The balance of relationships within transatlantic relations were
likely to change as Europeans became or assertive. How the United States manages this shift
will have a long-term impact on the quality of the transatlantic relationship.
If U.S. policies undermine
respect for the U.S. it will
be harder for the U.S.
to manage even natural changes in alliance relationships over time.
The Impact on America’s
Work in International Organizations
As then Secretary of State Dean
Acheson wrote America
was “Present at the Creation” of the post-war international institutions. The U.S. helped create a world in which
multilateral organizations helped maintain international order. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
which are part of the United Nations system, the UN itself with a permanent
seat for the United States, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and later the World Trade Organization are all part of an international system
from which the United States has benefited greatly. In 1945 world leaders gathered in San Francisco to sign the
United Nations Charter. In 1948, under
the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt and experts from many countries, the U.S.
led the effort to craft the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. For decades the United States has championed
international human rights. Often we
have led the way calling on the international community to condemn human rights
abusers. The U.S. has also advocated improving
human rights mechanisms. The U.S.
criticized the shortcomings of the old UN Human Rights Commission. Finally the world agreed to reform the UN and
the poor standing of the U.S.
on human rights meant that we were not able step up to the challenge. Just when the international community was
ready to listen to our ideas, the U.S. approach was pugnacious rather
than persuasive. As the Subcommittee’s
report notes, words matter; tone matters, especially in diplomacy.
As the Subcommittee report
documents, international opinion about the United
States declined in response to renditions, holding
detainees at Guantanamo and the policy of denying
the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to prisoners held outside the United States
in the “war on terror.” The use of
tactics that many would call torture undermined the image of the United States
as a country that respected certain norms.
This condition made the U.S.
voice less credible in the diplomatic discourse on reform of the UN human
rights mechanisms in 2004-2006. The
perception of the U.S. being
unilateral affected U.S.
leadership at the World Bank.
International human rights. U.S. diplomats and non-governmental
organizations had long bemoaned the flaws in the system. The Human Rights Commission was supposed to
uphold the principles of the Universal Declaration and subsequent human rights
documents. Although it existed amid the
tension between universal human rights and state sovereignty, it was still able
to help advance the observance of basic principles. One feature was the country-specific
resolution that called attention to human rights abuses in a specific state. Not all UN member states were on the
Commission. States had to compete for
slots on the fifty-three member body. As
the years passed, more countries with notoriously bad human rights records were
joining to prevent passage of resolutions affecting them.
By 2005, UN member states were
ready to undertake a major reform effort.
They created the Peacebuilding Commission and strengthened the High
Commissioner for Human Rights. They also
launched the effort to replace the Human Rights Commission with a new body that
fixed the flaws in the old system. That
year the UN Secretary-General heeded U.S.
calls for reform of UN human rights mechanisms, but the U.S. was poorly
placed to respond. In his 2005 report,
“In Larger Freedom,” then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,
called for the Human Rights Commission to be replaced by a smaller Human Rights
Council. This moment could have been a moment for U.S.
leadership. Yet, after Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo was not able
to lead effectively on the reform human rights issue. U.S. appeared to have abandoned its
commitment to the rule of law and relinquished its role as an advocate of
international human rights.
The U.S.’s inability to persuade others
meant that even good ideas failed to be included in the new Council. One of the most important features was how
the membership would be selected. Many
argued that members of the new Human Rights Council should meet certain human
rights standards. The Secretary-General,
the United States, Canada, Japan and many European countries
argued that candidate countries should receive a vote of two-thirds of the
General Assembly present in order to be elected. In the end, the states decided that only a
simple majority of UN member states was required.
The abrasive style of the then U.S. ambassador
to the United Nations, John Bolton, had already alienated many at the UN. The sporadic, but brusque engagement by the U.S. left many wondering if the U.S. were really
interested in reforming the institutions it had helped found decades earlier. Here was a chance for serious reform and our
low standing on human rights and harsh tone meant that the U.S. was not able to advance its
positions successfully. Had the
standing of the U.S.
been higher, it might have been better able to push for serious candidate
criteria for membership in the new Human Rights Council. The international community would welcome a U.S.
that wanted to engage positively on human rights. Without the input of the United States,
the new Human Rights Council has not done well.
Started without the U.S.,
the Council was launched like a ship with a hole in its hull. A component of restoring the U.S. standing
on human rights could be helping to right the listing vessel.
Under this Administration, the U.S. already had an example of the decline in
the standing of the U.S.
affecting its ability to advance its policies.
The U.S.
had been a member of the Human Rights Commission since its founding. Every time its term of office expired, it was
reelected. However, in 2001, in the wake
of the Bush Administration’s rejection of the Kyoto
treaty on climate change, and “un-signing” of the Rome Statute creating the
International Criminal Court, the United States was not reelected to
the Human Rights Commission. After over
fifty years, the U.S.
was no longer a member of the world’s leading human rights institution. By 2005, the status of the United States
had deteriorated to the point that it did not run for a seat on the new Human
Rights Council. It was dissatisfied with
how the Council was constituted, but it was also not clear that the U.S. could have
won a seat if it had run. Stunningly, by
mid-decade the low standing of the U.S. on human rights issues meant
that there was doubt whether it could win a seat on a newly formed UN body.
The World Bank. Disillusionment with the U.S. has even
emerged at the World Bank. Traditionally
the head of the World Bank is an American and the head of the International
Monetary Fund is a European. When the
term of well-respected head James D. Wolfensohn expired, the Bush
Administration nominated one of the architects of the Iraq war
policy, Paul D. Wolfowitz. Many Bank
experts were wary of a man they thought advocated a more assertively unilateral
American foreign policy. Arguably, his
commendable effort at management reform with the Bank was undermined by
resistance to him as a symbol of the Administration’s policies and a reflection
of the decline of respect for the U.S. as a result of those
policies. Reform within a large
multilateral organization would have been hard, but here again a difficult
situation was made harder by the decline in the international standing of the U.S.
America’s Reputation and International Affairs
Not only has the decline in America’s reputation had a deleterious affect on
relations with Europe and on multilateral
issues, the timing is also important. The
decline in respect for the United
States comes at a particularly unfortunate
time in international affairs for at least four reasons:
- Just at a time when some societies are opening up to
democracy and human rights, the U.S. is losing credibility to
advance these values;
- Just as emerging regional powers are choosing how to
integrate into the international system, the U.S. is less able to advance
its views;
- Globalization needs rules, but perceptions of U.S.
unilateralism makes it less able to advance global norms;
- The importance of international identity issues to
international politics makes the U.S. model especially
relevant, but its credibility is weakened.
Societies opening up. In recent years many countries have
begun to accept values the U.S.
expounds: experiments with local democracy, greater respect for human rights, a
greater degree of empowerment for women, or increased receptivity to market
economics. For example, Kuwait
launched a small parliament with some powers.
Morocco
hosted a truth and reconciliation process to investigate past human rights
abuses. Such changes are difficult in
many societies and would benefit from political support from the U.S. Yet, just at a time when some societies are
opening up, the U.S.
is losing credibility to advance these values.
Emerging powers. Not only China
and India, but Brazil, South Africa and other countries
are playing an increasingly important role in global affairs. More states will be able to advance their own
interests in the international system.
Over the years the U.S.
has benefited when other countries agreed that it was in their interest to
adopt democracy and market economics and accept U.S. leadership. After the Second World War, the U.S. created a system in which the reemergence
of Japan and Germany helped “the West” and reinforced U.S.
leadership. Today, the decline in America’s reputation may make emerging powers
less willing to accept U.S.
leadership. Instead they may prefer a
world of increasing non-polarity with no clear international leader.
The United States should not
squander its potential for leadership in the organizations to which is does
belong. There are important
organizations to which the U.S.
does not belong. In some cases this is
not detrimental to the United
States.
The U.S. is not and
will not be a member of the European Union, but the EU developed with U.S. support and complements the U.S.
role in the world. Still, despite the
compatibility of interests, the U.S will not have a vote at the EU table where
certain important decisions will be made.
More challenging could be institutions which could be developing in
opposition to western ones such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO focuses on resolving border disputes,
but some of its members are inclined to use it to counteract western influence
in the region. Members include China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan. India
and Iran
are observers. Some scholars foresee a
“world without the West” in which the U.S. and other “western” states are
excluded from emerging international institutions.
Globalization Needs Rules. Economic globalization is changing the way
goods, services, and labor are managed across many parts of the world. Yet
greater economic integration and dependence needs rules to run smoothly. Such rules include agreed banking and
accounting principles, product safety regulations and enforcement, labor
standards and environmental safeguards.
As the world’s largest economy, the U.S. can benefit greatly from
globalization. However, even the U.S. needs international rules and
ways to enforce them. Such rules can
help safeguard Americans from lead paint on toys and avoid supporting
sweatshops with workers toiling for low wages.
Yet if the U.S.
flouts international standards and holds itself above international rules, it
weakens its ability to advance international norms.
International Politics and
Identity. Ironically, the U.S.’s
reputation is declining just as identity politics gains prominence in
international affairs. The press of
globalization, migration and modernization change traditional ways of doing
things, often for the better, but not without discomfort. Many societies are grappling with how to
manage ethnically diverse populations amid change. While societies need to draw on their own traditions
to sustain moves towards greater human rights, the examples of others can help
inspire reformers. The American
experiment in pluralism and the search for unity from diversity could
contribute to the international discussion of national identities, tolerance
and cohesion. Yet, the perception that
the U.S. violates its own values
undercuts the U.S.’s
ability to advocate those values.
Conclusion
The Subcommittee’s hearings have
demonstrated the decline in America’s
reputation. This hearing has considered
the impact of that decline on our country’s national interests. Yet, the situation is not without
solutions. As the Subcommittee has noted
in many parts of the world people who have had direct contact with Americans or
a chance to visit the United
States often retain a more positive attitude
than those with no contact. At least
their opinions may be based on a more informed understanding of the United States.
Increasing opportunities for positive contact between Americans, especially
students, and people in other countries could help the United State
rebuild its reputation.
Fundamentally, however, policies
matter. America’s standing in the world
will be determined by the quality of its policies and the wisdom of its
leadership. In this testimony I have
endeavored to show that the decline in the international standing of the United States affects its ability to implement
policies even among countries and institutions usually supportive of the United States. Our close allies in Europe
and members of international organizations have been disappointed in our
policies. This disappointment and frustration stems from their belief that we
could play a positive role in international affairs if we chose to do so. Restoring America’s reputation through sound
policies would be a way to start.