Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
U.S. Department of State
April 8, 2008
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment
Mr.
Chairman, Ranking Member Manzullo, and Members of the Committee: Thank you for
inviting me here today to talk with you about our policy in Central
Asia. Central Asia is a
strategically important region at the crossroads of Eurasia. It is going through a period of tremendous
change. Many countries have interests
there, not least the United
States.
While the United
States faces challenges to its interests, I
firmly believe there are opportunities for positive transformation in the
region that can lead to lasting peace and prosperity.
To begin, let me clearly state that U.S. policy in the region is firmly
based on the premise that the five Central Asian nations are sovereign and
independent states with whom we should maintain multi-dimensional relations on
a broad range of issues. Our policy is
to emphasize our relations with Central Asians themselves. We seek to maintain mature bilateral
relations with each country based on our foreign policy goals and values and
each country’s specific characteristics and dynamics.
Our overall goal in the region is clear. We aim to support the development of fully
sovereign, stable, democratic nations that respect human rights. We also want them to be integrated into the
world economy and cooperating with one another, the United States, and our partners to
advance regional security and stability.
Our strategy rests on three integrated pillars: fostering security cooperation; expanding
commercial and economic opportunity; and promoting internal democratic and
economic reform and protection of human rights.
We see these three pillars as inextricably linked and mutually
reinforcing. Genuine stability, in our
view, is best achieved when citizens have a stake in a government that respects
their rights. Stability in turn fosters
economic development, accelerates growth, and broadens wealth. Thus, we are determined to pursue all three
pillars in a balanced way.
We are promoting multiple linkages to connect Central
Asia to the world.
Countries should never be left with only one option — one market, one trading
partner, one vital infrastructure link. Central Asia is a landlocked region, far from
major maritime trading routes.
But it was once a crossroads of global trade and can be once again. Central Asia
lies next door to some of the world’s most dynamic economic regions. The more options Central Asians have, the
more choices they have, the more independence they have.
Secretary
Rice has articulated a clear vision for a stable and democratic Central Asia,
one that is increasingly connected to South Asia. It is in the interest of the Central Asian states to build linkages to the south that
complement their existing ties to the north, east and west. Our goal is to help them revive ancient ties
between South and Central Asia and to help
create new links in the areas of trade, transport, democracy, energy and
communications.
In August 2007, I was at the opening of a new bridge spanning the Pyanzh River
that now connects Tajikistan
and Afghanistan. Designed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
and funded by the U.S. Government with a major contribution from Norway,
the bridge will boost economic development by increasing regional trade and
investment, and stimulating small and medium-sized businesses and farms. Already since the bridge opened, Afghan vehicle
traffic to Tajikistan
has increased seven-fold and border tax revenue ten-fold. The bridge is an important piece of a future
regional highway network extending from Karachi,
Pakistan to Astana,
Kazakhstan, including a
network of more than 2,400 miles of roads within Afghanistan that have been
constructed or reconstructed since 2001.
The U.S. is also
advocating for the countries of Central Asia to supply power to northern Afghanistan,
and helping to develop the Afghan electricity system so Afghans can benefit
from that connection. Together with
other donors, we are also exploring ways to export electricity from Central
Asia beyond Afghanistan to Pakistan and eventually India. Trade in electricity can benefit both sides,
providing much-needed energy to South Asia and serving as a major source of
future revenue for the countries of Central Asia.
Mr. Chairman, in your letter of invitation to this hearing today,
you asked a number of questions about U.S. policy in the region including our
efforts in the areas of democracy and human rights, security, and Central Asian
energy. These issues are certainly high
on our agenda in Central Asia and we work with
each of the five Central Asian states to advance these objectives. The rate of progress often differs in each of
the five countries, but we make clear to each of our Central Asian partners
that we expect to move forward in all areas of cooperation.
Human
Rights and Democratic Reform
Democratization and respect for human rights are fundamental to U.S.
goals in the region. Not only are they
important goals in their own right, we also believe stability and prosperity
come when the government respects the rights of its own people and is
responsive to them. Additionally, when
people are able to influence the political process through legitimate, peaceful
means, they are less susceptible to extremist ideas and violent means of
political expression.
While our policy on human rights is clear, it is often our
toughest challenge in the region. The
post-Soviet legacy of authoritarianism makes it difficult to nurture democratic
reform. The challenge increases as our
resources decline. Assistance to Central Asia in the areas of human rights and democratic
reform has been one of our more effective levers in moving the reform process
forward. Our assistance has helped
create stronger electoral institutions, fostered civil society, built
government capacity to create democratic institutions and political parties and
improved some media environments. The challenge rests in creating the political
will to properly implement legislation and to convince ruling parties that some
dissent and difference of opinion is not a threat to their security. As we work with our Central Asian partners in
this area, we recognize that each of the region’s countries is quite different
and we must tailor our approach to the local environment.
We are working with the Government of Kazakhstan to fulfill the commitments
it made when it was selected to become Chairman in Office of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe in
2010. The Government committed to
modernizing its election, political party, and media legislation by the end of
2008. It also committed to preserve the
existing mandate of the Organization’s Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights and defend the Office against any future efforts to weaken
it. The Madrid Commitments for the
Chairmanship may become a useful catalyst for Kazakhstan to intensify political
reform.
In Turkmenistan,
the government has begun to open up its society under the leadership of
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Turkmenistan
has freed some political prisoners and is discussing reform of the state media
and widening the availability of information.
The government has publicly pledged to review international agreements
to which they are signatories with a view towards meeting international
standards on human rights. These are
first steps. Turkmenistan has a long way to go. We seek to open a dialogue directed toward
identifying potential areas for bilateral cooperation, including strengthening
civil society and access to information, and promoting transparency and
accountability. We continue to press the
government on individual cases of concern as well as continuing severe
restrictions on political and civil liberties.
We will closely monitor their progress.
With
its vibrant civil society, relatively open media environment, and outspoken
opposition, Kyrgyzstan
has made impressive progress toward democracy since independence. In September 2007, our two governments
affirmed publicly that “Further development of democratic values and human
rights are priorities for both nations, and cooperation will continue in this
direction.” Nevertheless, the
disappointing constitutional referendum in October 2007, inadequate parliamentary
elections of December 2007, and restrictions on peaceful assembly indicate Kyrgyzstan
still has work to do. We deliver
consistent and clear messages at senior levels that the government must follow
through on its own stated goal of democratic reform and reinforce those
messages with wide-ranging programs that strengthen democratic institutions and
promote basic human rights. A $16
million Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program, signed March 14, 2008, will help Kyrgyzstan
promote the rule of law and combat corruption by encouraging reform in the
judicial and law enforcement sectors. Kyrgyzstan
qualified for the program in November 2005, and we made clear at the signing
that reforms in the area of democratic governance still need serious attention,
and the success of the program will depend on continued progress in the overall
process of democratization. In response,
the Kyrgyz government indicated a renewed commitment to the program and democratization
in general. We will continue to support
their efforts by providing the tools they need and delivering friendly but
frank messages about their progress.
In Uzbekistan,
we have made clear to the government that the U.S. desires a broad relationship,
one in which human rights and democratic development play a vital role. We continually urge the government of Uzbekistan
to take concrete actions to improve the human rights situation in the
country. Recently, we welcomed some
positive, albeit limited, steps taken by the government, including the release
of several prisoners of conscience, the resumption of visits on a trial basis to
detained persons by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the
passage of new legislation combating trafficking in persons. We have urged the government to take
additional measures to address serious human rights concerns.
In
Tajikistan,
the still vivid memory of the Tajik civil war leads some Tajiks to believe that
democratic reform leads to instability. We
are working to counter this message by gearing our assistance program to build
institutional capacity to improve government accountability, as well as
supporting the development of civil society.
Security
Our security relationships with the Central Asian states are
designed to support their own stability and independence and that of the region. In particular, we are grateful for the
Central Asian states’ support for the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan. The most high-profile example of our security
relationship with the region is the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan,
a critical logistics hub for the Coalition effort in Afghanistan. Other countries support international efforts
in Afghanistan
as well. Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan
provide overflight rights. Uzbekistan
also provides limited overflight rights and is an important transit route for
non-lethal supplies.
Equally important, our nonproliferation, counternarcotics, and
border security programs continue to produce results despite declining
budgets. For example, the drug control
agencies of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which U.S. funds helped to establish, continue to provide robust
collection of information, which is used to interdict the flow of narcotics and
traffickers coming through the region. We
are also looking to leverage the offices of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe as well as the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime to enhance customs and border security capacity throughout
the region.
Energy
Central Asia is clearly significant to our efforts to diversify
energy supplies to Europe and the United States. We also consider the development and
diversification of the Central Asian energy sector as a critical component in
our broader strategy to create those multiple economic linkages that increase
the independence of the Central Asian states and introduce market principles to
the regional energy market. We are
therefore working to facilitate multiple oil and gas export routes, including
trans-Caspian routes, to increase the region’s stability and prosperity.
Consistent with our policy of encouraging and supporting the
development of market based, competitive energy economies, the Administration
has been active in promoting private energy sector investment in the
region. Presently, U.S. companies have substantial equity
investments in oil and gas production in Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, hopefully in the
near future, in Turkmenistan. We strongly support these countries and their
decisions to open their economies to private investment and world markets.
Likewise, the Administration, through the Department of Energy, has an active
bilateral effort to collaborate on the development and deployment of
alternative energy sources with several of our regional partners.
On March 31, President Bush announced that Special Envoy to the
European Union C. Boyden Gray will serve as Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy. Mr. Gray will engage directly with senior
European, Central Asian, Russian and other political and business leaders to
support the continued development and diversification of the energy sector.
Assistance to Central Asia
Mr. Chairman, you
asked questions concerning our assistance to Central Asia, specifically, if we
condition assistance on progress in democratizing and upholding human rights,
and if Congressional conditions on aid to Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan have affected
U.S.
policy. Our assistance policy for the
region is designed to support our three pillar strategy of fostering security
cooperation, expanding commercial and economic opportunity, and promoting
internal democratic reform and protection of human rights. In fiscal year 2008, the total Department of
State-controlled budget for the Central Asia
region is $104.6 million. $54.6 million
is directed toward democratic reform and economic development, including
efforts to promote respect for human rights, democratic reform, build civil
society, and create jobs and market-oriented economies. Approximately $28.8
million of the total is allotted for security assistance including
counter-narcotics and border control programs, military exchanges, and
non-lethal defense related equipment like radios and emergency response
equipment.
We constantly seek
to balance security assistance with democratic progress and upholding human
rights, and we make clear to all our Central Asian partners that we desire
broad relationships that require progress in all areas of cooperation. Other than Congressional restrictions on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, there are no formal
conditions on security assistance, but we make sure that progress on other
fronts will not come at the expense of human rights. We also believe that our security assistance
furthers our goals of sovereignty and independence while strengthening military
reform and promoting civilian control, thus complementing our assistance in the
area of democracy and civil society development. We can often use the countries’ interest in
security cooperation to open the door to broader engagement on the rule of law
and, ultimately, democratic development.
Though it is often in the clear interest of the U.S. to cooperate on anti-terrorism,
nonproliferation and counter-narcotics efforts, we are careful to ensure that
security assistance does not inadvertently enhance governments' abilities to
repress their citizens.
Congressional
restrictions exist on aid to the governments of Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan
in appropriations legislation. With
regard to Kazakhstan,
these restrictions have been waived on national security grounds. Nonetheless, the restrictions in legislation highlight
the importance we give to democratic progress and respect for human rights. While not formally related, they also remind
us of the importance of Kazakhstan’s
commitments it made upon being selected to become the Chairman in Office of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
in 2010. On Uzbekistan, Congressional
conditions put in place in 2004 and 2007 severely limit our assistance to the
central government and underscore our serious concern with the human rights
situation there. However, these
restrictions also hinder our ability to quickly respond to positive changes,
encourage additional support for Afghanistan’s
struggle to defeat regional terrorism and extremism, and limit our options to
react to sudden changes as has been the case in Turkmenistan. These restrictions affect our policy to the
extent that we use them as tools to focus those governments on Congressional
concerns.
Conclusion
Mr.
Chairman, Secretary Rice has articulated a vision for a stable and democratic Central Asia, marked by strong cooperation among the
nations themselves and with the broader region for mutual benefit. Furthermore, we cannot overstate the
importance of these countries to the long-term stability of Afghanistan. We have ambitious policy objectives in a
region still burdened by Soviet legacies.
We face enormous challenges at a time when our resources for the region continue
to fall. We sincerely thank you for your
support in past years and appreciate the flexibility you have provided us to
address serious challenges in the region.
We ask for your serious consideration and full funding of the Fiscal Year
2009 request.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee,
thank you again for this opportunity to discuss this important region. I stand ready to take your questions.
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