STATEMENT OF REP. GARY L. ACKERMAN
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH
ASIA:
IS THERE A STRATEGY TO GO WITH ALL THAT MONEY?
May 14, 2008
Good
afternoon. The subcommittee will come to
order. Last week I suggested that the
major elements of U.S. foreign assistance consisted, metaphorically speaking,
of sending Lawyers, Guns and Money: that promoting democracy, free markets,
civil society, and the rule of law strengthens our partners in the
international community; that supporting our allies with appropriate arms and
training is morally right and smart policy; and that using our wealth and
access to our economy to help friendly nations to grow their economies and to
develop their governance capacity is a smart use of our taxpayers' money. In
essence, Lawyers, Guns and Money are the key pillars supporting American
foreign policy, but each element has its limit as well. In South Asia,
all three components are necessary but are not, by themselves, sufficient.
Pillars are are just that, pillars. They are not the
whole structure; they are tools and tactics to help us achieve our policy
goals. And in South Asia, they are often tactics
in search of a strategy.
South Asia
is arguably the place from which America faces the greatest
terrorist threat. It was in Afghanistan that
al Qaeda plotted and carried out the attacks of September 11. It is in the tribal areas of Pakistan where al Qaeda and the Taliban have
reconstituted themselves and from where they attack our forces, as well as
those of both Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Yet since the beginning of the year there has
been a series of reports all of which suggest the United States has no overall
strategy for dealing with Afghanistan, Pakistan or the terrorist threat the
emanates from both.
With regard to Afghanistan, the Atlantic Council states: “Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.” The Center for the Presidency’s Afghanistan
Study Group concludes: “The mission to
stabilize Afghanistan
is faltering.” The International Crisis
Group maintains: “Afghanistan is
not lost but the signs are not good.”
In the case of Pakistan, the Government Accountability Office
found that, “The United States has not met its national security goals to
destroy the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA
region.”
While the President and his Administration
don’t seem very adept when it comes to strategy, either having one or
implementing one, the Bush Administration is very good at spending money, lots
of it and mostly on guns. In terms of
foreign assistance, and even in terms of U.S.
policy, South Asia was a backwater until
September 2001. From that point forward,
U.S.
assistance and attention to the region sky-rocketed. Since America
was attacked, South Asia has become second only to the Middle East in terms of U.S. military
assistance. Over the past 6 years, the United States
has spent $15.6 Billion on training for the Afghan National Army and Police,
yet the army is still incapable of operating on its own and the police are so
bad that most Afghans are more afraid of them than they are of the Taliban.
In Pakistan, over the same six year
period, the Bush Administration has provided $1.5 Billion in Foreign Military
Financing and $5.56 Billion in Coalition Support Funds. The former to buy radars, and anti submarine
planes to track the non-existent al Qaeda air force and navy and the latter
disappeared into the Pakistani Treasury for unspecified services allegedly
rendered. Yet Pakistani officials
complain, and have done so to me directly, that they lack the capabilities and
training to conduct effective counter-insurgency operations. So we shouldn’t be too surprised that the GAO
supports that claim and found that:
“Pakistani security forces lack counterinsurgency capability”; that the
Pakistani Army “is neither structured nor trained for counterinsurgency”; and
that “serious equipment and training deficiencies exist in the Frontier
Corps.” What did the Bush Administration
spend all that money on? If the situation
weren’t so dire and our need for success not so absolute, I’d suggest that additional
appropriations to security forces in either nation was throwing good money
after bad.
Leaving
the urgent to address the merely important for a moment, there are other
nations in South Asia which are in various
stages of civil war reconciliation, or governmental transition where the right
mix of Lawyers, Guns and Money could mean the difference between a failed state
and democratic development. In Sri Lanka, the
government continues to prosecute the war against the LTTE, the Tamil terrorist
group, but in provincial elections on Saturday, a splinter group of the LTTE
gained enough seats in a coalition with the ruling party to form the next
provincial government. Press reports,
however, indicate that the election was fraught with irregularities like
ballot-box stuffing, voter intimidation and beatings. Because former LTTE members, who face
accusations of murder, harassing opposition voters and candidates and
recruiting child soldiers, will now be part of the provincial government, the
Bush Administration is faced with the legal question of how to provide
assistance to areas of the country partially controlled by an organization,
which while not actually designated a foreign terrorist organization used to be
part of one.
In Nepal, the Maoists did surprisingly
well in elections for the constituent assembly.
So well, in fact, that they will now not only be writing a new
constitution but will likely be forming a new government. Since the Maoists are a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization, the continued provision of U.S.
assistance to Nepal
appears on its face to be illegal. While
no one supports funding terrorist organizations, continued reconciliation and
democratic development in Nepal
is in the interest of the United States,
so I will be interested to hear whether the Administration believes assistance
to Nepal
should continue and if so, how it intends to proceed.
In Bangladesh,
the caretaker government, which has lasted a lot longer than a caretaker
government ought to, is preparing for elections, hopefully by the end of this
year. I support the Administration’s
call for lifting emergency rule. Free,
fair and transparent elections cannot be conducted when the rights to speak and
assemble are restricted. The caretaker
government has taken a partial step, allowing indoor political gatherings, but
it must go much further to ensure a legitimate election in December.
The one
country I haven’t spoken about is India, a giant sea of relative
tranquility surrounded by chaos and instability. India has experienced enormous
economic growth in recent years, but it still has three-quarters of a billion
people who live on less than a dollar a day and faces serious public health
problems like the threat of HIV/AIDS and a lack of potable water. And even though India is growing stronger
economically, I am still dismayed that the Administration chose to cut funding
for HIV/AIDS. While I don’t think that
countries should receive our assistance indefinitely, I do think we run the
risk of undoing progress already made by cutting assistance prematurely.
Lawyers, Guns and Money.
Each one is necessary but in different degrees in different countries;
each is insufficient by itself. Without
a strategy to bind them together they are only means without an end. And that unfortunately, is what we have seen
from the Bush Administration in this region.
Since 2001 we’ve spent $38.67 Billion and we are no closer than we were
when we began to a peaceful, stable, secure South Asia. As I said last week, that’s some legacy.